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Most civil lawsuits in the United States are settled out of court
through negotiation rather than in court through adjudication.'
Nevertheless, the disputes that do go to trial impose substantial
costs on litigants2 and the country.3 The high costs of pursuing a
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comprehensive and incisive written and oral critiques, and especially Lee Ross for his consul-
tation on social science laboratory research methodology.
1. One seminal empirical study, now over 20 years old, found that only 4.2% of automo-
bile liability claims filed against insurance companies ultimately reach trial. See H. LAU-
RENCE Ross, SETrLED our OF CoURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENTS 217 (1970). A more recent study found that approximately 8% of civil suits
filed in state and federal courts went to trial, and another 22.5% of those cases were disposed
of by judges, most through dismissal, summary judgment, or default judgment. See David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 89 (1983). More than
50% of the claims settled out of court prior to adjudication. Id. Criminal suits also settle in
overwhelming numbers through plea bargaining. See JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING
AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.2 (2d ed. 1983).
2. Litigants incur both psychic and financial costs. According to Marc Galanter, who
cites a number of empirical studies to support his argument, trials impose substantial emo-
tional costs on both plaintiffs and defendants. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litiga-
tion Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 8-11 (1986). "For plaintiffs and defendants alike, litigation
proves a miserable, disruptive, painful experience. Few litigants have a good time or bask in
the esteem of their fellows - indeed, they may be stigmatized. Even those who prevail may
find the process very costly." Id. at 9 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs and defendants also incur
financial costs at trial. Trubek et al., supra note 1, at 90-93. Costs fall into two categories:
out-of-pocket costs - including legal fees, expert witness fees, and so on - and the "mone-
tary value of the time clients spend on cases." Id. at 91. Generally speaking, the more legal
actions that take place, the higher the costs incurred - that is, increased legal fees, client
time away from work, and trial fees, such as expert witness fees, stenographic costs, and
travel expenses. Id. at 104 (finding that "duration does not have a substantial effect on
hours.... [T]he more motions filed and discovery conducted, the more hours spent."); see
also RAND: THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES
IN THE U.S. 135-36 (1991) (finding that about one-fifth of personal injury plaintiffs "were told
that the fee would depend on the length of time required to resolve the claim, the ultimate
amount received, or whether or not a trial was required").
3. J.S. Kakalik and R.L. Ross examined public spending on civil disputes during fiscal
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claim to a trial verdict have led most commentators to hypothesize
that trials represent mistakes - breakdowns in the bargaining pro-
cess - that leave the litigants and society worse off than they
would have been had settlement been reached.4 The emphasis
courts have placed on encouraging settlements and discouraging tri-
als implies that the judicial system agrees.5
In attempting to create a general framework for explaining why
settlement attempts fail and trials occur, commentators have devel-
oped two primary explanations, both of which assume that the dis-
putants are rational actors. Proponents of the standard economic
models of settlement hypothesize that because settlement is almost
always less costly than trial, parties will reach agreement out of
year 1982 in J.S. KAKALIK & R.L. Ross, CosTs OF THE CIVIL Jus17cE SYSTEM: COURT Ex-
PENDrrUREs FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF CIVIL CASES (1983). This was "the first book ever to
estimate the amount spent on civil litigation in the United States." Edward Brunet, Measur-
ing the Costs of Civil Justice, 83 MICH. L. REv. 916, 917 (1985) (reviewing KAKALIK & Ross,
supra). Although a very small percentage of cases actually went to trial, KAKALIK & Ross,
supra, at xiii, half of the money spent by the government on civil litigation was for trials. Id.
at 37. Indeed, the amount of public spending on litigation depended heavily upon whether
cases were disposed of before or after trial. Cases disposed of early in the process imposed
relatively minor costs on the public. A case that ended after the filing of the claim cost the
government less than $50, and "a case that ended after one hearing and one conference cost
between $207 and $358 to process." il. at 41. In contrast, in a case involving "one hearing,
two conferences (cases generally do not reach the trial stage without a second conference),
and a jury trial, the average state government expenditure escalated to about $3500 in Flor-
ida, $2800 in Washington, and $11,000 in Los Angeles." Id. at 41-42.
4. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225,225 (1982) (concluding that a trial "represents a
bargaining breakdown"); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. RE,. 319, 320 (1991)
("A trial is a failure."); Trubek et al., supra note 1, at 122 ("[B]argaining and settlement are
the prevalent and, for plaintiffs, perhaps the most cost-effective activity that occurs when
cases are filed.").
Of course, a trial creates social benefits as well as costs. For a discussion of the relation-
ships between these, see Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit
in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 333-34 (1982). For cases with great prece-
dential value, a trial might be more socially efficient than an out-of-court settlement. See
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984) (arguing that in some types of
litigation - civil rights, for example - the positive externalities created by trial verdicts can
make the social benefits of a trial greater than its social costs). Fiss fears that "[p]arties might
settle while leaving justice undone." Id. at 1085.
5. Courts have devised a number of procedures aimed at promoting settlement. One of
the most commonly used is the judicial settlement conference. Robert J. MacCoun et al.,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Trial and Appellate Courts, in H"ANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAw 95, 107 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) ("Perhaps the most common
forum for attempts to increase settlement in civil cases is the judicial settlement conference,
in which a judge or magistrate meets with the attorneys in a case to try to resolve the case
short of trial."). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 makes the facilitation of settlement an
explicit goal of the conference. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16. Other judicial procedures aimed at
promoting settlement include mediation and summary jury trials. MacCoun et al., supra, at
105-06, 110-13. For a thorough discussion of how judges actively intervene in litigation to
encourage settlement, see Herbert M. Kritzer, The judge's role in pretrial case processing:
assessing the need for change, 66 JUDICATURE 28 (1982).
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court as long as they agree on the expected value of a trial; the
litigation costs they save represent joint gains of trade achieved
through settlement, which the litigants can then distribute between
themselves. Conversely, trials will occur when one or both parties
miscalculate the likely outcome of the trial. 6 Other commentators
- focusing on the distributive bargaining issues that arise when the
parties recognize that they would create joint gains by reaching out-
of-court agreement but must determine how to divide that savings
- hypothesize that disputants fail to settle when one or both par-
ties employ rational distributive bargaining strategies that lead to
impasse, as they will on some occasions.7
We have no quarrel with either of these theories, but we believe
that they fail to explain the full range of litigation negotiation fail-
ures. While they are elegant in their simplicity, their explanatory
power is limited by the narrow assumptions about human behavior
on which they rely. When individuals engaged in litigation must
choose between settling a lawsuit out of court and seeking a trial
verdict, we predict that they will not always act in the rational way
that the economic and strategic bargaining models assume. We hy-
pothesize that even in the absence of miscalculation and strategic
bargaining, psychological processes create barriers that preclude
out-of-court settlements in some cases. Specifically, we predict that
psychological effects will impact how litigants perceive, understand,
and respond to settlement offers in the following three ways:
How the offer is framed will affect settlement rates ("framing").
People avoid risk when they choose between options they under-
stand as gains, but they prefer risk when they select between
choices viewed as losses.8 Therefore, we predict that settlement
rates will depend on whether the offeree understands a given settle-
ment offer as a gain or loss. If an offeree views accepting an offer as
a gain, he is likely to prefer settlement - the less risky alternative
- to trial; if he sees the offer as a losing proposition, he is likely to
prefer trial - the more risky option.
The status of the relationship between the parties will affect settle-
ment rates ("equity seeking"). People want what they are legally
entitled to, but they also want recognition of their claim's validity.9
Therefore, given the same legal rights, we predict that litigants will
6. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part HI.
9. See infra Part IV.
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be more likely to reject a settlement offer if they view the offeror as
morally blameworthy or as disrespectful of their claim.
Who makes the offer will affect settlement rates ("reactive devalu-
ation"). People do not like to do things their adversaries want them
to do.'0 Therefore, a settlement offer that a litigant would evaluate
favorably in the abstract or when suggested by an ally or neutral
third party is more likely to meet with disfavor when proposed by
the adversary.
In this article, we seek to substantiate "psychological barriers,""
as illustrated by the constructs described above, as a third explana-
tion for the failure of legal disputants to settle out of court.'2
Although we are not the first to hypothesize that psychological
processes can, in theory, affect legal dispute negotiations, 13 we at-
tempt to give more definition to the otherwise vague contours of
the psychological barriers hypothesis by bringing empirical data to
bear on the question.14 To achieve this end, we conducted a series
of nine laboratory experiments - involving nearly 450 subjects' 5
- designed to isolate the effects of the three psychological
10. See infra Part V.
11. This term is used in the negotiation literature. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Constance Stil-
linger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTATION J. 389, 392 (1991).
12. Our secondary goal is to respond to the surprising scarcity of controlled laboratory
experiments concerning legal issues in general, and the subject of litigation settlement in
particular. What follows is a fairly exhaustive list of experimental work on the subject of
litigation settlement: Don L. Coursey & Linda R. Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior
Within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental Evidence, 8 INTL. REv. L. & ECON.
161 (1988) (using bargaining games to test the effect different systems of allocating legal costs
will have on settlement); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993) (studying the effects of self-serving biases
and notions of fairness in settlement negotiations); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar,
Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 13 (studying the effects of the increased use of "offer of settlement
devices" and the heightened visibility of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68); Linda R. Stan-
ley & Don L. Coursey, Empirical Evidence on the Selection Hypothesis and the Decision to
Litigate or Settle, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 145 (1990) (testing the rational actor selection hypothe-
sis). Linda Stanley and Don Coursey conclude the presentation of their findings with the
observation that "as the quantity of experimental data on litigation bargaining increases, the
procedural aspects of civil dispute will become less ambiguous." Id. at 164.
13. Many commentators have provided theoretical or anecdotal accounts of how psycho-
logical barriers may affect the negotiation of legal disputes. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin,
Why Negotiations Fail- An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OnIo ST. J.
ON DisP. REsOL. 235 (1993); Ross & Stillinger, supra note 11.
14. The notion that psychological barriers can impede successful negotiations may seem
like no more than common sense to anyone who has participated in any type of negotiation.
See, e.g., ROGER Fi1smR & WILLIAM URY, GE-nNG To YEs 19 (2d ed. 1991) ("[People] see
the world from their own personal vantage point, and they frequently confuse their percep-
tions with reality. Routinely, they fail to interpret what you say in the way you intend and do
not mean what you understand them to say."). Our goal is to define more clearly some of
these barriers and to lend empirical support to their existence and magnitude.
15. See infra Part II for a complete discussion of our research methodology.
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processes outlined above on parties' decisions about whether to ac-
cept settlement offers or to opt for formal adjudication. Our results
substantiate the basic hypothesis that non-value-maximizing consid-
erations can affect decisions about whether to settle or try disputes,
and our experimental findings cast light on the circumstances under
which psychological barriers are more or less likely to affect settle-
ment possibilities. The clearer understanding that stems from em-
pirical research, we believe, will benefit future research on the
impact of psychological barriers to litigation settlement.
Part I of this article describes the dominant rational actor para-
digms of legal dispute resolution and suggests a theoretical role for
the psychological barriers hypothesis. Part II describes the research
methodology employed in our experiments. Parts III, IV, and V
review the results of our experiments on how the psychological con-
structs of framing, equity seeking, and reactive devaluation can af-
fect litigation settlement negotiations. Part VI discusses some of
the implications of our findings for practitioners seeking to resolve
litigation in the economic interests of their clients. Finally, the arti-
cle concludes with a discussion of how an understanding of the ef-
fect of psychological processes on litigation settlement combines
with the insights provided by existing economic models to create a
richer understanding of how litigants perceive, think about, and re-
spond to settlement offers.
I. RATIONAL ActOR SEtTLEMENT THEORIES
A. The Standard Economic Account of Settlement
According to standard economic explanations of the trial-
versus-settlement decision, a defendant will be willing to settle for
an amount equal to the cost of an adverse trial judgment multiplied
by the percentage chance of losing the case, plus trial costs, minus
out-of-court settlement costs. A plaintiff will be willing to accept a
settlement offer in the amount of a favorable judgment multiplied
by the likelihood of a favorable judgment, minus trial costs, plus
out-of-court settlement costs.1 6 Lawsuits will settle if the defend-
ant's maximum offer is higher than the lowest offer the plaintiff will
accept.17
16. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Adminis-
tration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-20 (1973).
17. Id at 417. For a similar analysis of the criminal law process, see William M. Landes,
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 66 (1971) ("[A] necessary condition
for a settlement is that both the defendant and prosecutor simultaneously gain from a settle-
ment compared to their expected trial outcomes.").
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The clearest articulation of the assumptions behind the standard
economic model is offered by George Priest and Benjamin Klein.18
The Priest & Klein model assumes that litigants form rational esti-
mates of the economic consequences of both trial and out-of-court
settlement, compare the two, and act solely on the basis of that in-
formation. According to the simple version of the model, the plain-
tiff and defendant estimate their chances of success in court, the
level of damages likely to be awarded, the costs of trial, and the
costs of settlement before deciding whether to settle the dispute out
of court,19 As long as the costs of trial are higher than the costs of
settlement, 20 and as long as both sides make an identical estimate of
the likely outcome of the trial, the case should settle.21 In effect,
both parties in such a case agree on the risk-discounted value of a
jury verdict, so they have no incentive to incur the high costs of
trial. 2
If the parties' predictions regarding the outcome of a trial differ,
Priest and Klein predict that the dispute will settle out of court any-
way, provided that the difference in expectations is smaller than the
plaintiff's and the defendant's combined differential between the
cost of trial and the cost of settlement.P A simple example makes
the logic of this prediction clear: Consider an automobile accident
that leads to a negligence lawsuit in which the plaintiff believes she
has a 40% chance of winning a $100,000 judgment at trial, while the
defendant believes the plaintiff has only a 30% chance of winning a
$100,000 judgment. The plaintiff will then value a trial judgment at
$40,000, while the defendant will expect a trial judgment to cost him
$30,000. If plaintiff's and defendant's combined cost of litigating to
a verdict, less their combined costs of settling the dispute out of
18. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL, Sru. 1, 3-6 (1984).
19. Id. at 12-13.
20. Attorney's fees are usually the principal litigation cost in civil disputes. See Trubek et
al., supra note 1, at 91-92. Generally the costs of trial are so much greater than the costs of
settling out of court that some theorists simplify the equation by assuming the costs of set-
tling to be zero. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of
Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989).
21. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 16-17 ("In litigation, as in gambling, agreement over
the outcome leads parties to drop out.").
22. This assumes both parties are either risk averse or risk neutral. If one party is risk-
seeking, she might prefer to pay trial costs for the opportunity to take the gamble. See
Landes, supra note 17, at 67.
23. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 13. A sufficient condition for trial is Pp - Pd > (C -
S)IJ, where Pp = plaintiff's estimate of his percentage chance of winning at trial, Pd = de-
fendant's estimate of plaintiff's percentage chance of winning at trial, C = the litigants' com-
bined trial costs, S = the litigants' combined settlement costs, and J = the amount that will be
awarded to plaintiff if he succeeds at trial. Id. at 12-13.
[Vol. 93:107
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court, is greater than $10,000, both sides will be better off settling
the dispute out of court for an amount between $30,000 and
$40,000. For example, if the plaintiff and the defendant expect that
litigating the matter to a trial verdict will cost each of them $20,000
more in attorney's fees than if they settle out of court, the plaintiff
should accept a settlement of greater than $20,000, and the defend-
ant should favor any settlement of less than $50,000. The $10,000
difference between the plaintiff's and defendant's estimates of the
value of a trial should not prevent a settlement that could produce
$40,000 of joint savings.
Conversely, the model predicts that if the costs of trial minus the
costs of settlement are less than the difference between the two par-
ties' estimates of the value of trial, the dispute will proceed to
trial.24 In the above example, if each party anticipates that a trial
will cost it $2,000 more in costs than a settlement, the defendant will
offer no more than $32,000 as a settlement and the plaintiff will
accept no less than $38,000. There will then exist no mutually ad-
vantageous bargaining range and, thus, no possibility of settlement.
One important assumption of the Priest & Klein model is that
the parties are risk neutral - that is, they are equally attracted to a
certain settlement amount and a fifty percent chance of receiving
twice that amount. If the parties are risk averse, each would have
an even stronger preference for settlement than the above exam-
ples would suggest.Z5 The plaintiff in the above example might be
willing to accept some amount less than $40,000 - before figuring
in costs of trial and settlement - and the defendant might be will-
ing to pay something more than $30,000. If risk aversion is strong
enough, its effect alone might drive a settlement, even if the parties
do not consider the high costs of trial relative to settlement.26
Another important assumption of the basic Priest & Klein
model is that the parties have equivalent stakes in the dispute.27
The purest example of this is a dispute between two "one-time play-
ers" who have nothing more to gain or lose from the dispute than
24. Id.
25. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1076 ("Risk aversion thus increases the
surplus ... which presumably increases the probability of a settlement."); Coursey & Stanley,
supra note 12, at 164 ("Since trial is less attractive to risk averse parties than to risk neutral
parties, ceterisparibus, the surplus from settlement is higher and trial is less likely."); John P.
Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279,280-81 (1973) ("[W]hen two
risk-averse individuals become involved in a conflict that has an uncertain outcome for each,
they can both gain by eliminating uncertainty and settling the conflict with a riskless transfer
of wealth.").
26. Gould, supra note 25, at 286.
27. See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 24.
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 113 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
the damage award. If one party to the dispute is a repeat player
with an interest in obtaining a verdict that will have precedential
value in subsequent disputes, the predictions of the Priest & Klein
model will not necessarily hold.28 Assume, for example, that the
defendant in the above automobile accident case is an insurance
company involved in hundreds of similar disputes every year, while
the plaintiff is an individual accident victim who foresees no further
involvement in the litigation process. If the defendant insurance
company anticipates that a trial will cost it $20,000, it may choose
not to offer the plaintiff a $50,000 settlement - defendant's $30,000
expected trial judgment plus $20,000 costs - because a defense
verdict at trial would establish precedent for future cases or because
it desires to avoid developing a reputation as a carrier that suc-
cumbs to the threat of litigation.29 If one litigant believes that a
trial will have either a positive or a negative impact on her interests
beyond the bounds of the particular litigation, the parties have
asymmetrical stakes in the litigation - stakes that may either ex-
pand or reduce the bargaining range and, therefore, make settle-
ment more or less likely.30
B. Strategic Bargaining
The Priest & Klein model assumes that when there is a range of
settlement outcomes that will leave both parties better off than they
would expect to be after a trial, they will reach a settlement.3 1 Stra-
tegic bargaining theorists focus on the parties' attempts to move
from identifying a range of potential settlement options to agreeing
on a single one. Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, and Robert
Mnookin suggest a model of litigation bargaining failure in which
trials are caused by distribution problems; specifically, parties agree
that settling out of court would create a joint surplus, but they can-
28. Id at 24-29. Depending on the nature of the asymmetrical stakes, settlement could
require a smaller difference between the two parties' expectations of success or could be
possible even in instances when the difference in expectations is greater than the parties'
combined costs.
29. Priest and Klein make the converse point that if the loss of a case will severely dam-
age a defendant's reputation, the defendant might overpay to settle the case out of court. Id.
at 24-26.
30. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1075 ("To illustrate, a defendant who wants
to cultivate a reputation for tough bargaining will contest cases thathe has little chance of
winning. Conversely, a defendant who wants to avoid the publicity of a trial will settle cases
that he has a high probability of winning.").
31. Richard Posner notes that this might be an unrealistic assumption in multiparty litiga-
tion in which there are incentives to hold out, but he assumes the assumption is valid in the
more typical case of two-party negotiations. See Posner, supra note 16, at 417-18 & n.27.
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not decide how to divide that surplus.3 2 If one party demands more
of the surplus at the negotiating table, he stands to receive more of
the surplus if the dispute settles out of court, but he assumes a
greater risk of bargaining breakdown and a resulting trial, which
will destroy the surplus.
33
Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin predict that one or both parties
may use "hard" bargaining tactics, which might loosely be termed
"brinksmanship,"3 4 in an attempt to garner a larger portion of the
surplus. The cost of such an approach is the risk that negotiations
will fail and that a trial, with its attendant costs, will result.3 5 Sup-
pose, for example, that both the plaintiff and the defendant expect
the plaintiff to win a $35,000 damage award at trial. Suppose fur-
ther that staging the trial would cost each party $10,000. Because
the parties would avoid this trial cost if they settled out of court, a
settlement would create a surplus of $20,000 to be divided between
plaintiff and defendant. Assume that the defendant, in an attempt
to appropriate all of the surplus, makes an initial $25,000 settlement
offer, which the plaintiff rejects. After extending this offer, the de-
fendant might adopt a hard bargaining strategy and stand firm on
the $25,000 offer - rather than increasing the offer to $30,000 or
$35,000 - hoping that the plaintiff will accept it on the proverbial
courthouse steps.36 If the plaintiff capitulates at the eleventh hour,
the defendant is $20,000 better off than he predicted he would have
been after trial. If the plaintiff does not settle, the expected cost to
32. Cooter et al., supra note 4, at 226 ("The fundamental cause [of trials] is the problem
of distribution faced by the players."); see also David E. Bloom, Is Arbitration Really Com-
patible with Bargaining?, 20 INDus. REL. 233 (1981) (examining the circumstances under
which parties are likely to settle or resort to binding arbitration). Other economists have
constructed more complicated accounts that consider how the presence of symmetric or
asymmetric information will affect strategic bargaining. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Liti-
gation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984); I.P.L.
P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Tria 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983).
33. Cooter et al., supra note 4, at 231. For another description of how strategic bargain-
ing can frustrate settlement, see ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
487-92 (1988).
34. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 199-201 (1960).
35. See, e.g., Cooter et al., supra note 4, at 231 ("If a player adopts a hard strategy, then
he receives a larger share of the stakes in the event of settlement. But a harder strategy is
less likely to result in settlement. If the pair of strategies chosen by the players is too hard,
then the dispute will be resolved by trial.").
36. The parties engaged in the strategic bargaining will continuously adjust their strategy
based on the behavior of their adversary. But as the trial date draws near, the defendant will
have to make a calculated decision about whether to make one final concession without
knowing with certainty whether the plaintiff will accept the offer on the table. Similarly, the
plaintiff will have to decide whether to accept the offer on the table without knowing with
certainty whether the defendant will make one final offer.
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the defendant is $45,000 - a $35,000 trial award plus $10,000 in
litigation costs.
The problem for the defendant is that he can never be sure
whether the plaintiff will fold or call his bluff; he can only estimate
the likelihood of each possibility.37 If the defendant believes there
is a 90% likelihood that the plaintiff will accept the offer and only a
10% chance that she will not, the defendant could quite rationally
hold out until the end of the game: namely, when the jury returns a
verdict. The expected value of the defendant's payout if he holds
firm with his $25,000 offer is (90% x $25,000) + (10% x $45,000) =
$27,000. If the 10% chance turns out to be the reality, the defend-
ant loses the gamble.3
8
In the Cooter, Marks & Mnookin strategic bargaining model,
like the Priest & Klein model, trials result from miscalculation.
With limited information and a high degree of uncertainty, each dis-
putant must estimate the likelihood of a variety of events. Some-
times, even the most savvy will be wrong. In the Priest & Klein
model, the key estimate is the percentage chance of success at
trial.3 9 In the Cooter, Marks & Mnookin model, the key estimate is
the percentage chance the adversary will accept an offer that di-
vides the surplus. Under the assumptions of either model, inaccu-
rate estimates, however rational, will frustrate settlement efforts
and push the parties to trial.
C. Psychological Barriers as the Third Leg
The Priest & Klein and Cooter, Marks & Mnookin models ex-
plain why rational, value-maximizing actors fail to reach a settle-
ment even when it is in their best interest. We accept the premises
of both models. We agree that an overlap of bargaining ranges is a
necessary condition for settlement. So too are negotiating postures
by both sides that are not so hard as to discourage the other party
from settling. But these conditions, though necessary to produce an
37. This problem exists because a litigant decides what negotiation strategy to pursue on
the basis of her own "observable" and "unobservable" traits, but her opponents can only
predict her likely strategy based on her observable traits. Cooter et al., supra note 4, at 231-
32; see also Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 20, at 1079 ("A party may overestimate a partic-
ular opponent's willingness to make concessions, which can cause a breakdown in settlement
negotiations and a trial.").
38. In this example, the defendant loses the gamble because his prediction that the plain-
tiff will accept the offer turns out to be wrong. This type of miscalculation is more likely to
occur in disputes among strangers, due to less familiarity with the other litigant's personality
traits. Cooter et al., supra note 4, at 237.
39. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 7-12.
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out-of-court settlement, are insufficient to guarantee one.40 Even
in the presence of both conditions, trials can result if disputants and
their attorneys do not overcome psychological barriers to
settlement.
Psychological barriers, which are cognitive and perceptual in na-
ture, prevent disputants from acting in a value-maximizing, utilita-
rian manner. Although the psychological phenomena tested in our
study - the framing of settlement offers, personal animus and eq-
uity seeking, and the reactive devaluation of offers proposed by the
adversary4' - are well known in social science and negotiation cir-
cles, this article presents the first scientific evidence of their impact
on decisionmaking in the litigation setting.42 Our general conclu-
sion is that these psychological constructs can cause legal disputes
to go to trial even when there is a viable bargaining range and no
strategic behavior by the disputants.
43
While it seems logical to predict that psychological effects
demonstrated in other arenas will be present in the litigation con-
text, some unique features of litigation could mean conclusions
drawn from other negotiation contexts would not be transferable.
In many other bargaining contexts, the alternative to a negotiated
agreement is the status quo - no agreement. This is not so in liti-
gation bargaining, where the default result is a court-imposed solu-
tion. Litigation creates a unique bargaining context where the
litigants negotiate in "the shadow of the law."44 This feature of liti-
40. Economists modeling litigation settlement often admit that their models may be in-
complete. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Tria A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 n.8 (1982).
41. See infra Parts III-V.
42. Commentators have noted the need for experimental research on how psychological
barriers affect litigation settlement negotiations. In one set of experiments, Stanley and
Coursey tested aspects of the Priest & Klein model using laboratory methods. See Stanley &
Coursey, supra note 12. In their conclusion, they write:
The experiment above was not designed to study the psychological effects of the negotia-
tion process. However, the results suggest that these effects may determine, in part, the
outcome of negotiations. Carefully controlled laboratory experiments, like the one
above, can play a key role in the process of sorting out these direct and psychological
effects.
Id. at 164.
43. Our work to this point is insufficient to create a model that could predict whether
individual disputes will settle out of court or result in trial, although such a model might be
possible after considerably more research is conducted on the subject. For a more complete
discussion of the modeling implications of our results, see infra text accompanying notes 237-
44.
44. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979) (discussing how in-court outcoines can affect out-
of-court settlement negotiations); see also Gould, supra note 25, at 296 ("The concept of legal
precedent is in effect a means to provide stationarity over time to the probabilities and hence
to increase the opportunities for out of court agreement." (footnote omitted)).
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gation bargaining could, in some situations, provide additional in-
centives for disputants to reach agreement, resulting in more
rational bargaining behavior than occurs in other contexts.45
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. Experimental Research v. Actual Dispute Data
Empirical research conducted by legal scholars on why some
disputes settle and others do not has been limited primarily to the
analysis of actual disputes that have resulted in trial. 46 The study of
actual trials has a major benefit: the disputes studied are like real-
world disputes because they are real-world disputes. Provided that
the sampling is not biased, whatever conclusions can be drawn from
the sample are likely to be applicable to the general population of
legal disputes.47
But the analysis of actual disputes has two important shortcom-
ings, one practical and one methodological. The practical problem
is that, while there is ample information about disputes that go to
trial, there is very little about disputes that settle.48 The method-
ological problem is that it is extremely difficult to isolate and ex-
amine the impact of any single independent variable when the data
set is made up of actual disputes.49 An example from the dispute
resolution literature illustrates this difficulty:
45. See Coursey & Stanley, supra note 12, at 161 ("The legal institution used in trial
becomes, in effect, a third party to the negotiation process and to a great extent determines
whether and at what level pretrial settlement will occur.").
46. See, e.g., MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN
TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY ILLINOIS, 1960-1979, at 2 (1982), (analyzing 9000 civil
cases tried in Cook County, Illinois between 1960 and 1970); Gross & Syverud, supra note 4,
at 321 (examining 529 civil jury trials in California state courts); Donald Wittman, Is the
Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185, 200 (1985) (analyzing 582 rear-
end accident jury trials in California courts).
47. In social science terminology, such studies are externally valid - "the findings of the
study can be generalized." JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 50 (1985).
48. Stanley & Coursey, supra note 12, at 146. Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud liken
studying dispute resolution by analyzing cases that have gone to trial to "studying the opera-
tion of an assembly line by looking at the rejects." Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 321.
There may be important subtleties about settlement that cannot be gleaned from examples of
nonsettlement.
49. In social science terminology, such studies suffer from problems of internal validity.
Internal validity "refers to the truth or accuracy of the inferences drawn from a study as
applied to the circumstances of that particular study." MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 47,
at 50; see also Dan Coates & Steven Penrod, Social Psychology and the Emergence of Dis-
putes, 15 LAW & SocY. REv. 655, 667 (1981) ("More generalizable results come from surveys
of actual or potential disputants[,] ... but these studies measure rather than manipulate
variables, with the consequence that clear causal inferences are impossible to make." (cita-
tion omitted)).
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Priest and Klein hypothesize that trials occur only when the
plaintiffs or defendants miscalculate their chances of success at trial;
thus, they predict that plaintiffs will prevail at trial fifty percent of
the time, because there is no reason to believe that either plaintiffs
or defendants will miscalculate more often than the other group.50
Attempts to validate the fifty-percent hypothesis by examining trial
data have proven inconclusive. Donald Wittman attempted to test
its validity by examining 582 rear-end auto accident cases in Cali-
fornia.51 He found that only seventeen percent of the trials resulted
in verdicts for the defendant.52 From that, he concluded that "[tlhe
50 percent hypothesis is soundly rejected," adding, for good mea-
sure, that "17 percent is 10 standard deviations from 50.1'53 Priest
contended, in response, that there was too much noise in Wittman's
data set to test the fifty-percent hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts
that plaintiffs will "win" fifty percent of cases that go to trial, but
the "winner" is only clear when the parties agree on damages but
disagree on liability. If the plaintiff and defendant disagree about
the defendant's liability but agree on the sum that will be awarded
to the plaintiff if he prevails, it is easy to judge who wins the case
and who loses: if the defendant is liable, the plaintiff wins; if there
is no liability, the defendant wins. Priest asserted that in rear-end
accident cases the defendant's liability is often clear to both parties,
but the amount of damages is disputed.54 Because of this, Priest
argued, it is not surprising that plaintiffs receive some award in
most of these cases, but an award in this type of case does not nec-
essarily constitute a victory for the plaintiff. Therefore, Priest
claimed Wittman's data did not disprove the fifty-percent hypothe-
sis. 5 This exchange is, of course, only one illustration of why it is
extremely difficult to use actual trial data to substantiate theories of
bargaining.
The controlled laboratory setting substantially mitigates this
problem because the experimenters can hold constant the variables
they are not testing.56 In a laboratory test of the fifty-percent hy-
50. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 17-18.
51. Wittman, supra note 46, at 200.
52. 1d at 201.
53. Id.
54. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's
Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 233 (1985).
55. Id. at 233-37.
56. We adopted two methodological strategies to control for variables we did not seek to
test. When possible, we designed our hypothetical litigation scenarios to eliminate possible
variables completely. Because this approach was not always possible or practical, we opted
for a "between-group" experimental methodology, in which we compared responses to itiga-
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pothesis, for instance, experimenters could ask subjects to negotiate
disputes in which both parties agree upon damages and liability is
the only issue. The outcome of such an experiment would provide a
much clearer sense of the validity of the hypothesis.5 7
B. Data Collection Methodology
1. Subjects
Subjects for our experiments consisted of 445 undergraduate
students at Stanford University recruited at a randomly selected
sample of dormitories across campus. We asked all willing students
to complete a written survey containing three different litigation
scenarios followed by one or two questions. We made no attempt
to control the number of students of a particular gender, ethnic
group, major, or year in college. Participants were told that the sur-
vey was part of a law school experiment on how people involved in
lawsuits respond to settlement offers and that it would require
about ten minutes of their time. They received a popular "Mrs.
Fields"-brand cookie as compensation for their participation after
they completed the survey.
All subjects received the same written instructions on how to
complete the survey.58 The instructions told the students they
would be asked to "play the role of a participant in three different
lawsuits. ' 59 After reading each hypothetical scenario, they would
respond to a settlement offer by checking an answer choice. The
instructions asked the subjects to read the information "slowly and
carefully" and not to discuss the survey with any other students
prior to completing it.60 All subjects completed the questionnaires
in the presence of the experimenters.
tion settlement offers made by one experimental group to responses made by another experi-
mental group given a slightly different set of facts. For all variables we wished to control, we
simply ensured that the fact patterns given each group presented the variable in the same
way. This way, differences between the groups could not be attributed to variables that were
the same across comparison groups. See, e.g., MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 47, at 59;
E. Allan Lind et al., Methods for Empirical Evaluation of Innovations in the Justice System, in
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW app. B at 82, 88-94 (1981); see also supra
notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
57. Few controlled laboratory experiments concerning the litigation settlement process
have been conducted. See supra note 12.
58. See infra Appendix A.
59. See infra Appendix A. Our experiments tested the responses of hypothetical litigants,
as opposed to lawyers representing litigants. See infra Part VI for a discussion of the imlilica-
tions of our results in a world in which lawyers play an important role in the litigation bar-
gaining process.
60. See infra Appendix A.
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2. Basis of Comparison
In each hypothetical scenario, the subjects assumed the role of
the plaintiff in a lawsuit. They read all the relevant facts of the case
as well as an analysis of possible outcomes should the subjects de-
cide to reject a settlement proposal and proceed'to trial. At the end
of each scenario, the subjects received a final settlement offer -
usually a cash offer 6' - which, as the instructions informed them,
they could either accept or reject and proceed to some form of for-
mal adjudication. They then assessed the likelihood that they
would accept the settlement offer on the following five-point scale,
with the scores in brackets assigned to each answer choice:
Definitely accept the offer [5]
Probably accept the offer [4]
Undecided [3]
Probably reject the offer [2]
Definitely reject the offer [1162
We created slightly different versions of each basic scenario;
each manipulated a single variable and held all other variables
constant. In our analysis of the effect of equity seeking on
individual disputants, for example, we constructed a landlord-
tenant dispute. In one version, the landlord had a reasonable
explanation for his failure to provide heat to the plaintiff's
apartment;63 in the other, he was simply acting in bad faith.64 The
version of a scenario any given subject received was determined
randomly.65 We draw conclusions as to the effect of each variable
in encouraging or discouraging settlement by comparing the
relative attractiveness of the same settlement offer 66 made to
61. In the case of a scenario regarding a custody dispute in divorce litigation, the settle-
ment offer made was in terms of days-per-month of visitation rights. See infra notes 114-24.
62. See generally infra Appendices B-Z.
63. See infra Appendix K.
64. See infra Appendix J.
65. Each subject received a packet containing three scenarios. Each of the three
scenarios given to any one subject tested for a different psychological barrier to prevent a
subject from "learning" from one scenario knowledge that could be applied to another of the
scenarios. We systematically scrambled the combinations of scenarios in. the packets to
minimize interaction effects. For example, when we used six different versions of a scenario
designed to test one psychological effect, six different versions of a scenario to test a second
effect, and five different versions of a scenario to test a third effect, the first 180 subjects
would receive different combinations of scenarios (6 x 6 x 5) before the combinations would
begin to repeat.
66. For each scenario, we determined the value of the settlement offer in the following
manner Prior to our actual experiments, we presented one version of each scenario to a
random sample of Stanford University undergraduate students. These scenarios were
identical to the ones presented to subjects in our subsequent experiments - with one
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subjects who had version A of a scenario with those who had
version B of the same scenario.67
The validity of this type of between-group study depends on the
essential similarity between the pool of subjects given version A of
a scenario and the pool given version B of the same scenario.68
exception. Instead of being offered a specific cash settlement, these students were asked the
question "What is the minimum amount of money you would accept as a settlement in order
for you to agree to drop your lawsuit?" We set the settlement offer in each scenario equal to
the median response received from these pre-experimental subject groups. We reasoned that
by using the median response we would present settlement offers likely to be accepted by
approximately 50% of our subjects and rejected by roughly 50%, absent the variable
manipulated in the experiment.
67. We conducted three statistical tests of the differences in responses given by subjects
with different versions of the same basic scenario: t tests, Mann-Whitney tests, and
proportional comparisons.
Our basic statistical comparison was a t test of the mean scores of the different pools of
subjects. The t test measures the likelihood that any observed difference between the two
mean scores is the result of an actual difference between the two groups' responses, as
opposed to random error. As is the social science convention, we deemed differences in
mean scores "statistically significant" if the chance that the difference was caused by random
error was less than 5%. The p values provided in the footnotes throughout this article
describe the likelihood that differences in means resulted from random error. See infra notes
107, 113, 122, 143, 163, 173, 177, 219, 231. For example, a value of p < .05 means there is a
less-than-5% chance that the difference was caused by random error;p <.1 means less than a
10% likelihood of random error - in other words, the difference is probably real, but the
certainty is not great enough to classify the difference as highly statistically significant. The t
statistics themselves are also reported for statistically significant comparisons with degrees of
freedom (total number of subjects involved in the comparisons adjusted based on the
distribution of responses) noted in parentheses for readers interested in the raw statistical
data.
Technically, a comparison of mean scores is only valid if the five-point scale is linear -
that is, if the difference between a score of 3 and 4 is the same as a difference between a score
of 4 and 5. It is possible that our subjects would perceive a greater difference between 3 and
4 ("undecided" and "probably accept the offer") than between 4 and 5 ("probably accept the
offer" and "definitely accept the offer"). In other words, a subject giving a response of 4
might be much closer to a 5 than to a 3, but a comparison of means treats the score as
equidistant from 3 and 5. To test whether the nonlinearity of our five-point scale could have
affected our results, we also conducted a Mann-Whitney statistical test, which compares the
median scores of the populations compared, making the nonlinearity of our five-point scale
irrelevant. We have reported p values for statistically significant Mann-Whitney tests, which
describe the likelihood that the difference between the median scores of two experimental
groups is caused by random error. When the results of both t and Mann-Whitney tests are
p < .05, the statistical validity of the results is very high. When one or both of the tests results
in p > .05 but p < .1, we still present our conclusions with the qualification that the data is
highly suggestive but lacks the imprimatur of high statistical validity according to social
science conventions.
We also compared the percentage of respondents giving each individual score (1, 2, 3, 4,
or 5) from one subject group to the next, the percentage of respondents giving a score of
either "definitely reject" or "probably reject" (Rejecters), and the percentage of respondents
giving a score of either "probably accept" or "definitely accept" (Accepters). The
significance of these comparisons tended to mirror the significance of the comparisons of
means. For this reason, we do not report the results of these tests throughout, although we
do present comparisons when the distribution of responses sheds additional light on the data.
We thank Bertram Malle, Lee Ross, Ian Ayres, Sanjaya Khare, Eric Talley, and the
Stanford Statistics Department Consulting Service for their statistics advice and assistance.
All errors in judgment are, of course, our own.
68. See Lind et al., supra note 56, at 91-94.
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Any relevant difference between the members of the two pools
creates the possibility that a difference in the results of Group A
and Group B might be caused by differences in the subjects rather
than differences in the versions of the scenario they evaluated. In
our series of experiments, each group consisted of thirty to sixty-
five Stanford University undergraduate students. Although there
might be relevant differences between individual members of the
pool, we assumed that in randomly assigned groups of this size, the
law of large numbers would have a leveling effect and there would
be no significant differences between the groups, on average.69
3. Controlling the Variables
In developing a theory of how parties negotiate agreements in
divorce disputes, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser identified
five factors that influence the outcomes of bargaining in legal dis-
putes: strategic behavior, transaction costs, bargaining endowments
created by legal rules, the degree of uncertainty concerning the
legal outcome if the parties go to court, and the preferences of the
disputants.70 In an effort to isolate and evaluate our psychological
barriers, we attempted to the greatest degree possible to prevent
any of these factors from affecting the results of our experiments.
The experimental design eliminated the first two factors from con-
sideration.71 We allowed the latter three factors to affect responses
to the questions, but we neutralized their impact on our conclusions
by allowing those factors to influence subjects in all experimental
groups that we compared to the same degree. 72
a. Strategic Bargaining. To study. the psychological variables
manipulated in the hypothetical lawsuit scenarios, we wanted to en-
sure that the subjects focused on the substance of the fact patterns
69. See, e.g., CLIFFORD J. DREw & MICHAEL L. HARDMAN, DESIGNING AND
CONDUCrIrG BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 168-69 (1985) (recommending a minimum of 12-14
subjects per experimental condition and, preferably, 20-25 or more). Another author
elaborates:
Large samples are not advocated because large numbers are good in and of themselves.
They are advocated in order to give the principle of randomization, or simply
randomness, a chance to "work," to speak somewhat anthropomorphically. With small
samples, the probability of selecting deviant samples is . . .greater than with large
samples.... With large groups, say 30 or more, there is less danger.
FRED N. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 119 (3d ed. 1986); see also
Lind et al., supra note 56, at 91 ("If the groups are sufficiently large, the laws of probability
assure us that it is very unlikely there will be any substantial difference between the group[s]
.... 1'.
70. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 44, at 966.
71. See infra sections II.B.3.a-b.
72. See infra section II.B.3.c.
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presented to them and did not concern themselves with negotiation
strategies. As a result, the experimental design artificially removed
from the hypothetical situations any benefit subjects otherwise
might have been tempted to think they could gain by behaving
strategically.
So that the subjects would not engage in strategic behavior, we
instructed them that the settlement offers made by the defendants
were final offers. Subjects were required either to accept the offer
or to reject it and go to trial. The surveys explicitly stated that there
would be no time for further negotiations or conversations with the
defendants before triaF3 and that they had no reason to disbelieve
that these were the final and best offers the defendant would
make.74 We intended for this description to convince the subjects
that settlement offers made by defendants were not the product of
hard bargaining positions and that plaintiffs could not hope to
achieve a greater distribution of the surplus by considering strategic
bargaining tactics of their own.
b. Transaction Costs. In the real world, the high cost of pursu-
ing a claim to trial can provide a strong incentive for out-of-court
settlement.75 To focus the maximum amount of the subjects' atten-
tion on the facts of the case and the psychological variables being
manipulated, however, we eliminated all consideration of legal fees,
the most significant transaction cost associated with trials,7 6 from
the experimental design 77 We accomplished this in the easiest way
73. Dispute resolution scholars have hypothesized that the imposition of a deadline can
mitigate against psychological barriers to conflict resolution. Because the deadline provides
the offeree with a causal explanation for why the offeror is extending the offer, the offeree is
less likely to be skeptical of the offeror's motives and more likely to be receptive to the offer.
See, e.g., Ross & Stilinger, supra note 11, at 398-400. Critics of our research design may
challenge the validity of our results on the ground that we imposed a deadline on our sub-
jects. We believe this criticism is misplaced. First, it is not at all clear that deadlines promote
settlement. Even assuming that deadlines do promote settlement, this would make all our
subjects slightly more likely to accept settlements than they would be absent the deadline.
Because our results are based on between-group comparisons, the impact of the deadline,
assuming it exists, would affect all our subjects equally and thus would not affect the compar-
ative results.
74. See generally infra Appendices B-Z.
75. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 1, at 20.
76. In one study of litigation costs, individual clients reported that payments to lawyers
represented 99% of their out-of-pocket costs, and organizational clients reported that law-
yer's fees represented 98% of their out-of-pocket costs. See Tubek et al., supra note 1, at 91.
77. In the American litigation system, with few exceptions, each party must bear its own
litigation costs, regardless of outcome. An extensive literature is available on the question of
how alternative methods of assigning costs would affect the number and type of cases that
settle out of court. See, eg., Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative
Fee Shifting Systems, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 173; John C. Hause, Indem-
nity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Shavell,
supra note 40.
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possible: each scenario stated that the attorney had agreed to rep-
resent the subjects for free, so the subjects need not take legal fees
into account when determining whether to accept the settlement
offer on the table.
78
We can predict that this contrivance would have the effect of
causing some percentage of our subjects to reject an offer they
would have accepted in a real-world situation in which legal fees
were an issue. This does not affect the validity of our results, how-
ever. Because our results are based on between-group comparisons
rather than the absolute responses of subjects, the fact that all sub-
jects will be relatively more likely to risk trial than they might be in
the real world does not affect the relevant comparisons.
A potential criticism of the no-legal-fees approach relates to ex-
ternal validity, a subject discussed at length below. 79 Because the
no-legal-fees approach makes an already hypothetical study slightly
less realistic, there is a concern that subjects may be less committed
to playing the role of a litigant than they would otherwise be, mak-
ing the applicability of our findings to real-world litigation more
questionable. We made a conscious decision to endure these criti-
cisms, however, based on our belief that making the hypothetical
fact patterns as simple as possible, while still conveying the infor-
mation important to our experiments, had immense value in focus-
ing subject attention on the issues we were studying. To present a
realistic description of attorney's fee structures that subjects should
consider when deciding whether to accept the settlement offers
would have required complicating the fact patterns with discussions
of such issues as hourly rates, contingent fee arrangements, and fee
retainers.
c. Legal Endowments, Uncertainty, and Individual Preferences.
All subjects asked to consider a particular scenario were endowed
with exactly the same legal rights, regardless of which version of
that scenario they received. All legally relevant facts were identical
across the variations, as were the attorney's analyses of the plain-
tiff's probability of prevailing at trial, if applicable. 80 Holding legal
78. See generally infra Appendices B-I, M-Z.
79. See infra section II.C.
80. See generally infra Appendices B-Z. The attorneys in our scenarios provide very little
information to their clients about likely recovery at trial. According to a recent study spon-
sored by RAND's Institute for Civil Justice, attorneys in the real world also provide few
predictions about prospective trial outcomes to their clients. See RAND: THE INsNrruTE
FOR CrWL JusTc, supra note 2, at 112. In fact, only one-third of the plaintiffs in the RAND
study ever discussed the "amount of compensation they might receive" with their attorneys.
Id.
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endowments constant across experimental groups was critical to the
validity of the experimental method.
All the scenarios contained a large amount of uncertainty about
whether the plaintiff would prevail at trial, consistent with the real-
ity that trial results in close cases are difficult to predict. Although
the level of uncertainty may make relatively risk-averse subjects
more likely to accept settlement offers than other subjects, there is
no reason to think that, given the random distribution of scenario
variations, any variation group would be, on balance, more or less
risk averse than any other variation group.81
Finally, the between-group experimental design also controls for
differences in individual preferences. While cash or noncash settle-
ment offers may have value that varies from one subject to the next,
the random grouping of subjects gives us no reason to believe that,
on average, preferences would vary between groups.
C. Potential Pitfalls of the Experimental Process: The Question
of External Validity
Although we consider the experimental method to be the best
way to test our hypotheses, we recognize that our approach is not
unproblematic. We are most concerned about the external validity
of our results. Put simply, results demonstrated in the laboratory
may not be replicable in real-world legal disputes. 82 Our methodol-
ogy raises four specific external validity concerns.
First, the subjects used in the experiments were not actual liti-
gants and, as a group, they may not be representative of the class of
actual litigants. We speculate that Stanford undergraduates as a
whole differ from the class of actual litigants in terms of age, life
experience, education level, and socioeconomic class. For any of
these reasons, Stanford undergraduates may not analyze settlement
offers in the same way actual disputants do.83 We could have em-
81. See supra section ll.B.2 (explaining the selection methodology, which we designed to
promote uniformity among the groups).
82. Id; see also Coates & Penrod, supra note 49, at 667 ("It is often difficult to generalize
from results obtained under such conditions to more realistic injurious experiences and
disputes.").
83. Recently, Margaret Neale and Gregory Northcraft addressed similar external validity
concerns by conducting an experiment in which they compared the impact of framing effects
on the decisionmaking of amateurs - that is, students - and experts - that is, professional
negotiators. See Margaret A. Neale & Gregory B. Northcraft, Experts, Amateurs, and Refrig-
erators: Comparing Expert and Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task, 38 ORoANIZATmONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305 (1986). They found that framing had similar ef-
fects on students and professional negotiators:
The data presented here support the generalizability of decisional biases to experts' deci-
sion behaviors in novel tasks. That is, it seems likely that when individuals - either
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ployed participants from actual legal disputes as subjects in our ex-
periments. This would, of course, have created its own problems.
Although such a subject pool would have accurately represented
the types of people who actually find themselves in lawsuits, such a
group's personal experiences with the legal system would probably
have influenced their responses. Alternatively, we could have stud-
ied the demographics of actual lawsuit participants and attempted
to recruit subjects who met that group's characteristics. Even had
we adopted such a time-consuming and expensive approach, it
would only have begged the question of which personal characteris-
tics are actually relevant to how people evaluate litigation settle-
ment offers: race, gender, age, socioeconomic status, educational
background, career, and so on.
Second, because the lawsuits we examine are hypothetical and
crafted to isolate certain variables rather than to mirror actual legal
disputes, subjects might not analyze these disputes in the same way
that they would analyze real-world legal disputes. We designed
each lawsuit scenario to be realistic enough to convey to subjects
the feeling of an adversarial litigation setting and to make it clear
that the stakes of the scenario were similar in scope and magnitude
to the stakes of actual lawsuits. But we also consciously described
the facts and the legal issues as simply as possible. All the scenarios
deal with real lawsuit topics - that is, vehicular negligence, ease-
ments, visitation rights, employment contracts, and landlord-tenant
disputes84 - but for the sake of simplicity, the legal analyses made
available to the participants did not, in all circumstances, corre-
spond to the actual state of the law.85 In other words, we decided to
minimize confusion for our subjects so that the experiments would
cleanly test the psychological barriers that interested us. The cost
of this strategy was, at times, oversimplification of legal doctrine.
amateurs or experts - are confronted with a unique decision setting, their judgments
and choices will be systematically influenced by decision characteristics such as framing
Id. at 316. Because they found that framing had a similar impact on the decisionmaking of
students and experts, they reached the conclusion that results from negotiation research rely-
ing solely on student subjects can be generalized to the real world of negotiation. Id.
84. We attempted to select topics to which our undergraduate subjects could relate, even
though most had not been in the positions described in the scenarios. Most of the subjects
drive cars, have lived in a house with property boundaries, have some direct or indirect expe-
rience with divorce, and have either dealt with an employer or landlord or plan to do so in
the near future. Other types of disputes for which they could make no personal reference -
commercial litigation, for example - might have made it more difficult for them to play the
roles we asked them to play.
85. In our discussion of each experiment, we note the extent to which the hypothetical
scenarios both mirror and diverge from the actual state of the law. See infra notes 99, 109,
116, 118, 139, 159, 193, 205.
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While we are comfortable that the level of realism in the experi-
ments was sufficient to conclude that the experimental results apply
to real-world situations, we recognize that we are not immune to
the criticism that more complex legal disputes might have elicited
different responses from subjects.
Third, our experiments do not replicate the time element pres-
ent in most settlement negotiations. In our laboratory setting, sub-
jects must learn the facts of the case, consider an offer, and respond
to the offer in a compressed time frame. In the real world, signifi-
cant time lags usually exist between the filing of a lawsuit, settle-
ment offers, and the trial date. This extended time period may
reduce the impact of psychological barriers by allowing plaintiffs
time to reflect, to learn, and to be persuaded by attorneys, friends,
and associates. Our experiments, however, closely replicate the
proverbial last-minute, courthouse-steps settlement offer, which can
allow little time for consideration or reflection before a reply is re-
quired. Many cases in the real world, in fact, do not settle until just
before trial or even during trial.
8 6
Finally, because the subjects are playing the role of litigants and
are not actual litigants themselves, they may be less committed to
expending the effort to make the best possible decision about
whether to accept an offer based upon their preferences. To the
extent that careful decisionmaking would make subjects in our ex-
periments either more or less prone to accept the offered settle-
ments, lack of commitment could affect the overall percentage of
respondents accepting settlements. Again, however, because we
are conducting between-group experiments and have no reason to
believe any randomly selected group of subjects from our pool
would be, on average, less committed to the experiment than any
other, we doubt that this shortcoming affects our findings in any
significant way.
86. One explanation for this might be that it is not until then that litigants have a clear
understanding of the strengths of each other's cases. As litigation progresses, the parties'
expectations about the outcome of a trial will often change. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v.
Texaco, 75 VA. L. Rv. 295, 296 (1989) (making this point in the context of the Pennzoil v.
Texaco litigation). The greater the understanding, the more likely that the two sides' esti-
mates of the probabilities of prevailing in court will converge. See Gould, supra note 25, at
287. When estimates converge, settlements generally should occur so long as trial costs ex-
ceed settlement costs or the parties are risk averse. See supra sections L.A-B.
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III. THE EFcrs OF FRAMING ON DECISIONS To SETTLE
A. Social Science Research on Decisionmaking Under
Uncertainty
According to the rational actor model of decisionmaking, peo-
ple seek to maximize utility by selecting the decision option with
the highest expected value. The rational actor model predicts that
decisionmakers will make an identical selection between two op-
tions regardless of whether they perceive both choices as desirable
or both as undesirable. This is because rational actors make deci-
sions based on the absolute values of possible outcomes without
regard to how those outcomes are described or classified.87
Research by cognitive psychologists, however, has demonstrated
that people depart from the rational actor model in systematic ways
when making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 88 People
routinely use a reference point heuristic when making such deci-
sions.89 Using this heuristic, people tend to evaluate options not
only on the basis of their absolute values - as the rational actor
theory postulates - but on the basis of the direction in which they
deviate from some reference point. In essence, people code options
as gains or losses from some referent; this coding, in turn, systemati-
cally affects preferences. 90
One consequence of this coding process is "loss aversion." 91
Loss aversion refers to the idea that people tend to disfavor a loss
from a given reference point more than they favor an equivalent
gain. Psychologists have shown, for instance, that people will de-
mand a much greater amount of money to sell an item they own -
a loss - than they will spend to buy the item if they do not already
own it - a gain.92
87. For a description of the model of decisionmaking under risk known as expected utility
theory, see, for example, Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk; 47 ECONOMuTRICA 263, 263-64 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman &
Tversky, Prospect Theory]; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the
Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. s251, s251-54 (1986) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman,
Rational Choice and Framing].
88. See Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 87.
89. See Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 OR-
GANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECIsION PROCESSES 296 (1992); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolutiorn A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RES-
OLtITION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., forthcoming 1995).
90. Kahneman, supra note 89, at 297; see also Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory,
supra note 87.
91. Kahneman, supra note 89, at 298 ("The general principle is straightforward: when an
option is compared to the reference point, the comparison is coded in terms of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of that option.").
92. See Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a
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A second consequence of the reference point bias, which we
consider in this section, is what the social science literature has re-
ferred to as the "framing" effect.93 This label refers to the idea that
people are risk averse in the face of what they perceive as a poten-
tial gain and risk seeking in the face of what they perceive as a
potential loss. In other words, people will often take the same risks
to avoid a loss that they will refuse to take to realize a gain of the
same magnitude.
A simple numerical experiment illustrates this point. When sub-
jects were asked to choose between a sure gain of $240 and a 25%
chance at a gain of $1,000, 84% selected the sure payment, even
though the expected value of the chance (25% x $1,000) is $10
higher. When the experimenters asked the same subjects whether
they would prefer a certain loss of $750 or a 75% chance of losing
$1,000, however, 87% selected the risky choice, although the ex-
pected value of the two is identical.94 The experimenters drew the
conclusion from this and similar experimental work that outcomes
are coded as losses or gains from some neutral reference point and
that "a person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to
accept gambles that would be unacceptable to him otherwise." 95
B. Framing and Risk Preferences in the Litigation Context
Although researchers have studied the impact of framing on ne-
gotiation and bargaining in general, 96 no studies have examined the
Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REv. 663, 667-69 (1994) (describing
the empirical evidence of the gap that exists between the price people are willing to pay for
an item and the price they demand to sell the same item).
93. See Kahneman, supra note 89, at 297; see also Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect The-
ory, supra note 87, at 268.
94. Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice and Framing, supra note 87, at s255.
95. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 87, at 287. In the experiment
described in the text accompanying supra note 94, subjects in the "gain" group faced different
end-state possibilities than subjects in the "loss" groups, although the different end states did
not affect the comparative economic value of risky and riskless choices. Tversky and
Kahneman have also demonstrated that even if options represent identical end states, people
exhibit different propensities to accept risk depending upon whether they code the options as
gains or losses. A simple numerical experiment illustrates this finding. Subjects in one group
were told that they were given $1,000 and then were asked to choose between a 50% chance
of another $1,000 and a certain $500. Subjects in the second group were told they were given
$2,000 and then were asked to select between a 50% chance at losing $1,000 and a certain
loss of $500. Id. at 273. Both problems offered exactly the same choice between two end
states: the first option in both cases was a 50% chance at $1,000 and a 50% chance at $2,000;
the second option in both cases was a certain net gain of $1,500. Yet 84% of the subjects in
the first group, which had the choice framed in terms of gain, selected the certain amount. In
contrast, 69% of the second group, which had the choice framed in terms of a loss, selected
the gamble. Id.
96. See, e.g., MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION AND RATION-
ALITY IN NEGOTIATION 44-48 (1991).
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framing effect in the litigation context. Yet litigation - which
often requires parties to decide between a certain settlement offer
and an uncertain trial verdict - presents an important, real-world
example of decisionmaking under uncertainty. To begin to fill this
void, we conducted a series of experiments in which we examined
the impact of frames on parties to legal disputes. We hypothesized
that the propensity to accept a settlement offer during a legal dis-
pute would be dependent on whether the offeree viewed the settle-
ment offer as a gain or a loss.
To test this hypothesis, we first asked two groups of subjects to
consider a hypothetical lawsuit based on the most common of all
torts: an automobile collision.97 All the subjects received a nearly
identical set of facts.98 All had suffered $28,000 worth of damages
in an automobile accident that was not their fault. The other party
was insolvent and could pay nothing, but he did have insurance cov-
erage. The subjects learned that they had filed suit against the in-
surance carrier; the carrier, in turn, had conceded liability and
agreed that the plaintiff incurred $28,000 in damages but claimed
that the policy covered a maximum of $10,000 for accidents involv-
ing rental cars. Because the negligent driver was driving a rental
car at the time of the accident, the insurance company contended
that its liability was limited to $10,000. The subjects' attorney ad-
vised them that the only legal issue was whether the policy language
- which was unclear on the subject - limited the carrier's liability
to $10,000. The attorney also told the subjects that if the case went
to trial, a judge would render a decision based on the language of
the insurance policy. Based on his research, the attorney informed
the subjects that the case could go either way. Depending upon the
judge's interpretation of the insurance policy, the subjects would
recover either $28,000 or $10,000. 99 Prior to trial, the insurance
97. Gross and Syverud found that 21.7% of a representative sample of California trials
were vehicular negligence trials. Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 330.
98. See infra Appendices B-C.
99. This scenario, though somewhat simplified, is generally consistent with the law.
Judges do treat issues of insurance coverage in automobile collision claims as contract ac-
tions, not tort actions. As such, the language of the insurance policy, provided that it is
unambiguous, should determine the measure of recovery, though judges sometimes rely on
other factors. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Corbett, 134 S.E. 336 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1926); Haussler v. Indemnity Co. of Am., 227 Ill. App. 504 (1923). When the language
of an insurance policy is ambiguous or contradictory, judges generally construe the policy so
as to provide broad, but reasonable, coverage. See, e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Turner, 824 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In the real world, automobile insurance
policies, especially with respect to temporary-use cars, are often ambiguous or contradictory.
In Coleman v. Valley Forge Insurance Co., 432 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983), for example,
an insured plaintiff sued for collision coverage under his policy after he wrecked a temporary
substitute vehicle. The Florida Court of Appeals, which found provisions of the policy to be
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company offered the subjects a settlement of $21,000;100 the sub-
jects could either accept the offer or reject it and proceed to trial.101
In this scenario, all subjects found themselves in an identical
legal situation. All faced a choice between a certain $21,000 settle-
ment and a trial in which they would receive either $28,000 or
$10,000, depending on the outcome. Subjects were randomly as-
signed to either Group A or Group B of the automobile accident
scenario. The subjects in the two groups received versions of the
scenario that had only a single difference: the frames were altered.
Subjects in Group A were told they had been driving a $14,000
Toyota Corolla, which was destroyed in the accident.102 In addi-
tion, they suffered injuries that resulted in $14,000 worth of medical
bills. Their health insurance company had paid their medical bills,
but they had no private insurance to cover the replacement cost of
the car.103 In contrast, Group B subjects had been driving a $24,000
BMW.1°4 Their BMW was totaled, and they suffered injuries re-
sulting in $4,000 worth of medical bills. This group's health insur-
ance had also already paid the medical bills, but they had not been
reimbursed for the car.10 5 Both groups had losses from the accident
totaling $28,000, but Group A subjects had already been reim-
bursed for $14,000 of that total, while Group B subjects had been
reimbursed for only $4,000 of their losses. This meant that ac-
cepting the $21,000 offer would leave Group A subjects better off
financially than they were prior to the accident (-$28,000 + $14,000
+ $21,000 = $7,000). The same offer would leave Group B subjects
in a worse position'than before the accident occurred (-$28,000 +
$4,000 + $21,000 = -$3,000).
The survey asked the subjects to indicate their willingness to ac-
cept the settlement offer by selecting one of the following options:
Definitely accept the offer [5]
Probably accept the offer [4]
Undecided [3]
irreconcilable, held that the policy appeared to provide both liability and collision coverage
for a primary vehicle but only liability coverage for a temporary substitute vehicle. Hence,
the court ruled that the insurance company was under no obligation to provide coverage to
the plaintiff. 432 So. 2d at 1371.
100. For a description of the methodology used to determine the value of the settlement
offer, see supra note 66.
101. See infra Appendices B-C.
102. See infra Appendix B.
103. See infra Appendix B.
104. See infra Appendix C.
105. See infra Appendix C.
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Probably reject the offer [2]
Definitely reject the offer [1]
106
Although the legal endowments of subjects in Groups A and B
were identical, the framing of the settlement offer made a
significant difference in the propensity of the subjects to accept the
offer or to reject it and proceed to trial. Subjects in Group A
(Toyota Drivers) responded very favorably to the offer, providing
an average response of 4.43 (n = 42). Subjects in Group B (BMW
Drivers) also tended to favor the offer, but with much less fervor.
Their average response was 3.64 (n = 44). The difference between
these two means is highly statistically significant.' 0 7 Ninety percent
of Toyota Drivers said they would "probably accept" or "definitely
accept" the offer, while only 64% of BMW Drivers would
"probably" or "definitely" accept. Only 2% of Toyota Drivers -
one subject out of forty-two - would "probably" or "definitely"
reject the offer, but 20% of BMW Drivers would "probably" or
"definitely" reject the offer. The Toyota Drivers were inclined to
choose the certain gain offered by the settlement over the risk that
they might receive less at trial. The BMW Drivers apparently
coded the decision options differently than did the Toyota Drivers.
They perceived the settlement offer as a loss relative to the
preaccident position and were, as a result, much less likely than the
Toyota Drivers to accept the settlement. Many were prepared to
accept the risk of a large loss in return for an uncertain chance at a
payout that would leave them $4,000 better off than they were prior
to the accident.
We found similar results in a hypothetical scenario involving a
property dispute between neighbors. Subjects assumed the role of
homeowners in a densely populated section of Palo Alto,
California. 0 8 When they began construction of a swimming pool in
their backyard, they discovered that their neighbor's wine cellar
was built under their property. They discussed the matter with the
neighbor and discovered that he had known for fifteen years that
the cellar was built in the wrong location but had never mentioned
it because it had never been in their way. The subjects were told
that they agreed to allow their neighbor to keep the cellar where it
was but they felt that he should compensate them for the past and
future use of the land. The neighbor refused, so the subjects
106. See infra Appendices B-C.
107. t(77) = 3.65, p < .01 (Mann-Whitney, p < .01).
108. See infra Appendices D-E.
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responded by filing suit against the neighbor. The subjects' lawyer
advised them that if they prevailed at trial, the property values and
length of use suggested that an award of $15,000 was in order. It
was difficult to predict, however, whether the subjects would
prevail. The neighbor's lawyer argued that fifteen years of
uninterrupted use qualified the neighbor for free, perpetual use of
the land, known as an easement by prescription. 0 9 The subjects
were told that their attorney advised them the case could go either
way, as there was no recorded case quite like this in California. The
subjects could recover $15,000 at trial, or nothing at all. In a final
attempt to settle the case before trial, the neighbor offered a $6,750
cash settlement." 0
Again, we divided the subjects into two groups and, again,
manipulated the frames. The instructions told the Group A
subjects that, due to the location of the wine cellar, construction of
the swimming pool cost $2,000 more than it otherwise would
have."' For members of this group, the $6,750 settlement offer
appeared to represent a gain (-$2,000 + $6,750 = $4,750). Members
of Group B learned that the placement of the wine cellar caused
construction to cost $13,000 more than it otherwise would have. 12
To this group, a $6,750 settlement offer appeared to be a loss
(-$13,000 + $6,750 = - $6,250). Again, the scenario presented the
case in a way that made it quite clear that the costs incurred by the
subjects in no way affected their legal endowments.
As in the automobile collision scenario, subjects in the wine
cellar scenario were more likely to settle out of court when the
109. Generally speaking, an adverse claimant must show that his use of another's land is
adverse, continuous, known, and open in order to establish an easement by prescription. See,
e.g., Pace v. Carter, 390 A.2d 505 (Me. 1978). Most prescriptive easements are for walkways,
driveways, or surface roads, where the use is known and open. It is much more difficult for
an adverse claimant to establish that his use of underground facilities - drains, pipes,
sewers, or wine cellars, for example - qualifies him for a prescriptive easement. Offenhartz
v. Heinsohn, 150 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (denying a prescriptive easement to claimants
whose reservoir filled with spring water by means of a pipe line running underground
through their neighbor's property); Maricle v. Hines, 247 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
(denying a prescriptive easement to a homeowner who inadvertently discovered that her
sewer line ran under her neighbor's property and connected with her neighbor's sewer line).
On occasion, however, such underground facilities have been found sufficient for prescriptive
easement purposes. See Strehlow v. Mothorn, 280 P. 1021 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929)
(granting an easement to a claimant whose water runoff flowed into a ditch on his neighbor's
property); Reading Co. v. Maguire, 82 Pa. D. & C. 599 (Phila. County Ct. 1952) (granting a
prescriptive easement to a public utility whose water main ran underground through
defendant's property).
110. See infra Appendices D-E. For an explanation of how the proposed settlement
amount was derived, see supra note 66.
111. See infra Appendix D.
112. See infra Appendix E.
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frame of reference made the settlement offer look like a gain,
rather than a loss. Group A subjects (Gainers) were more likely
than not to accept the settlement, giving a mean score of 3.77 on the
five-point scale (n = 44). Group B subjects (Losers), on the other
hand, were more likely to risk the uncertain outcome of a trial than
to accept the settlement offer. They provided a mean score of 2.57
(n = 42). Again, the difference between the two groups is highly
statistically significant. 113 While 45% of Gainers said they would
"definitely" accept the settlement offer, only 7% of Losers would
"definitely" accept the offer. Fifty-seven percent of Losers
"probably" or "definitely" preferred trial, as compared to 25% of
Gainers.
We found the same phenomenon, in roughly the same degree, in
a scenario involving a dispute over a nonmonetary good -
postdivorce visitation rights. 114 In this scenario, the subjects, in the
midst of a divorce, were told that their spouse had been the primary
caretaker of their son during the marriage. As such, the subjects
were told they had agreed to allow their spouse to have physical
custody of their son. The subjects also learned that they enjoyed a
close relationship with their son and that they were concerned
about maintaining that relationship. Toward that end, the subjects
sought liberal visitation privileges from the spouse." 5 If they failed
to reach an out-of-court agreement with their spouse, both parties
would be required to go to family court, where a judge would
determine visitation rights under the "best interests of the child"
standard." 6 The subjects' attorney told them that judges tended
"to favor the preservation of both maternal and paternal ties" in
deciding this type of case,"i 7 but the attorney offered no predictions
about the outcome in court.1 8 Prior to the court date, the subjects
113. t(84) = 4.06, p <.01 (Mann-Whitney, p < .01).
114. See infra Appendices F-G.
115. Some commentators have claimed that divorcing spouses use custody and visitation
as bargaining chips in resolving such financial issues as property division, alimony, and child
support. See, e.g., ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 102 (1992). To preclude subjects in our study
from considering this kind of strategic bargaining, we specified in our scenario that the
divorcing spouses were in disagreement solely on the issue of visitation. See infra
Appendices F-G.
116. This is the nearly universal legal standard used in custody cases. See, e.g., CAL.
FAMILY CODE § 3100(a) (West 1994) ("[T]he court shall grant reasonable visitation rights to
a parent unless it is shown that the visitation would be detrimental to the best interest of the
child.").
117. See infra Appendices F-G.
118. Technically, visitation decisions are governed by the "best interest of the child"
standard. See, e.g., supra note 116. In the real world, however, it appears that courts
typically serve the best interests of the child by awarding visitation to the noncustodial
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received a final settlement offer from their spouse of ten visitation
days per month."19
In this scenario, we again manipulated the frames between
experimental Groups A and B. Group A subjects were told that
during the separation period preceding the divorce their spouse had
provided them with as many as five visitation days per month. 120
For Group B subjects, on the other hand, the temporary agreement
had allowed them fifteen days per month with their son.12'? As in
the automobile accident and wine cellar scenarios, subjects in the
divorce scenario responded very differently to the settlement offer
based on their respective frame of reference. Group A subjects
(Gainers) were likely to accept the offer. Their mean response on
the five-point scale was 3.78 (n = 45). Group B subjects (Losers)
were more likely not to accept the offer than they were to accept it.
Their mean response was 2.95 (n = 38). Once again, the difference
between the groups is highly significant.122 Losers were more likely
to risk an uncertain trial verdict than to accept a settlement offer
that appeared to leave them in a "worse" position than when they
began. Only 47% of the members of that group indicated that they
would "probably" or "definitely" accept the offer. Seventy-one
percent of Gainers, in contrast, chose the risk-averse option.
Moreover, more than twice as many Losers as Gainers said they
would "probably" or "definitely" reject the offer. The results of
this experiment are consistent with the previous two framing
experiments,' 23 but the context makes these results even more
parents on alternate weekends. See, e.g., MACCOBY & MNooKIN, supra note 115, at 172.
Thus, a typical visitation arrangement might include four visitation days per month, plus four
to six weeks of visitation during holidays, spring vacation, and summer vacation in a given
year. The mathematics reveal an average of six to eight days of visitation per month, which is
only slightly lower than the settlement offer made in our scenario.
Moreover, Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin, in their recently published
longitudinal study, found that a sizable number of divorced parents did not adhere to the
typical visitation arrangement. Id. According to Maccoby and Mnookin, "a substantial
group (about 20 percent of those having some visitation) said that they did not have a
definite schedule. Some of these parents said explicitly that they had an agreement
permitting the non-residential parent to see the children whenever he or she wanted to." Id.
For examples of liberal visitation rights granted to noncustodial parents, see Deininger v.
Deininger, 835 P.2d 449 (Alaska 1992), and Halper v. Halper, 348 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984). Despite our simplification of the facts and the law, then, this hypothetical
scenario remains relatively representative of the real world.
119. See infra Appendices F-G. For an explanation of how the proposed settlement
amount was derived, see supra note 66.
120. See infra Appendix F.
121. See infra Appendix G.
122. t(72) = 2.99, p < .01 (Mann-Whitney, p < .01).
123. We believe the experimental methodology is somewhat less reliable in this scenario
than in the automobile or wine cellar scenarios. In the other two scenarios, the subjects' legal
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surprising. We would anticipate that people would act more
cautiously when visitation with their children was at stake than
when money was at stake,124 but our results suggest that this is not
the case.
Figure 1
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Our results make it clear that frames matter in legal dispute
resolution.12 Disputants may reject a settlement offer
economically sufficient to produce a negotiated settlement if they
view it in relation to a reference point that suggests accepting the
offer would mean accepting a net loss on the transaction.
Conversely, an adverse party might perceive an offer framed in its
best light as favorable, even if she would reject a frameless
presentation of the same substance. To place the discussion in
terms of negotiation theory, if an offer made by one party is either
rights were clearly completely independent of the frame. In this scenario, however, it is
possible that some subjects believed the frame might have an effect on the parties' legal
rights. It would not be unreasonable for a subject to conclude that a judge employing the
"best interests of the child" standard would take into account the visitation schedule in place
prior to the divorce and would tend to favor continuity in parenting. If all subjects made this
assumption, it would be rational for Losers to reject the 10-day offer, assuming the chances of
winning 15 days through trial was extremely high.
Given this possibility, we would hesitate to push any conclusions drawn from this
experiment alone too far. Because the results of this experiment mirror the preceding two
experiments extremely closely, however, we are inclined to believe the results justify the
conclusion that the frame alone had a significant effect on whether the subject accepted or
rejected the settlement offer. The similarity of results across experiments suggests that
subjects in this experiment responded to the frame itself as opposed to inferring that the
frame might actually affect their legal rights.
124. But see Steven Shavell, Suit versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary
Judgments, 22 J. LEGAL STUD,. 1 (1993) (arguing that when parties seek nonmonetary
judgments, particularly if the judgment sought is indivisible - that is, the thing sought
cannot be divided between the parties - parties may be more likely to go to trial).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 97-124.
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marginally within the other party's range of acceptable settlements
or marginally outside the other party's range, the frame could affect
whether the dispute settles out of court or goes to trial.
It is, of course, little more than common sense to suggest that an
attorney involved in settlement negotiations should try to convince
her adversary that the adversary will gain, rather than lose, by
accepting the deal - that is, to suggest to one of our BMW Driver
subjects that he consider the settlement offer in relation to his post-
accident position as opposed to his preaccident position. Our
studies indicate one reason why this is sound advice: a positive
frame creates a psychological state that favors risk-averse behavior
- that is, settlement - and disfavors risk-seeking behavior - that
is, trial.
C. The Anchor as Frame
"Anchoring" is a cognitive psychological construct that can be
categorized as a variant of framing. Cognitive psychologists have
shown that people make estimates by starting at an initial "anchor"
position, which they adjust to yield a final estimate. Different
anchors create different expectations and yield different estimates,
and these estimates tend to be biased toward the original anchor.
Thus, anchors, like frames, serve to impede rational problem solv-
ing and decisionmaking.126
In one anchoring study, Edward Joyce and Gary Biddle divided
professional auditors into two groups.127 The experimenters
anchored the groups as follows: The study asked members of
Group A whether they thought significant executive-level manage-
ment fraud occurred in more than ten of each 1000 companies au-
dited by Big Eight accounting firms. The members of Group B
were asked to indicate whether they thought significant executive-
level management fraud occurred in more than 200 of each 1000
companies audited by Big Eight accounting firms.128 The experi-
menters tested whether these anchors - 10 in Group A and 200 in
Group B - would influence the answer to the second question
they asked the members of both groups: "What is your estimate of
the number of Big Eight clients per 1,000 that have significant exec-
126. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 ScIENcE 1124, 1128-30 (1974).
127. See Edward E. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic
Inference in Auditing, 19 J. AccT. Rrs. 120, 122-23 (1981).
128. Id. at 123.
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utive-level management fraud?" 129 Consistent with anchoring and
adjustment theory, Group A and B responses varied systematically.
Group A subjects estimated an average of 16.52 incidents of fraud
per 1000, while Group B subjects estimated an average of 43.11 in-
cidents of fraud per 1000.130 Thus, the rational judgments of these
professional auditors were influenced by the initial anchors to
which they were exposed.
In a similar study, Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale ex-
amined the impact of anchoring on real estate agents.'31 They gave
four groups of agents different list prices for a piece of residential
real estate and asked the agents to estimate the appraised value of
the house, an appropriate listing price, a reasonable price to pay for
the house, and the lowest offer they would accept for the house if
they were the seller. They found that the list prices served to
anchor the agents and affect their estimates. 132 In their words,
"[t]he listing price had a major impact on their valuation process;
they were more likely to have high estimates on all four prices when
the listing price was high than when it was low."'1 33 Bazerman and
Neale concluded that "the anchoring effect is not only present, it is
pronounced."' 34
D. Anchoring and Expectation Adjustment in the Litigation
Settlement Context
Dispute resolution scholars have noted that anchoring effects
may impede rational decisionmaking in the negotiation context,
particularly with respect to opening offers.135 That is, opening of-
fers may anchor the opposing side's expectations in negotiation and
impede rational decisionmaking behavior.'3 6 We explored the ef-
fect of an opening offer anchor on subjects' expectations and will-
ingness to accept a final settlement offer. Specifically, we
hypothesized that different opening settlement offers would anchor
129. Id.
130. ILd. at 125.
131. See MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTATING RATIONALLY 26
(1992).
132. Id. at 27.
133. Id
134. Id. at 28.
135. See, e.g., NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 96, at 49-50; Kahneman, supra note 89, at
309-10.
136. See, eg., BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 131, at 25 ("[A]n anchor will inhibit indi-
viduals from negotiating rationally."); NEALE & BAZERMAN, supra note 96, at 49 ("Suscepti-
bility to this bias can influence the negotiation process in a number of ways."); Kahneman,
supra note 89, at 296, 309_10.
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subjects' expectations regarding the value of the lawsuit in different
ways and would affect the likelihood of out-of-court settlement.
To test this hypothesis, we asked two groups of subjects to as-
sume the role of plaintiff in a hypothetical lawsuit involving a cus-
tomer unhappy with a new car. All the plaintiffs had recently
purchased a new BMW 318 automobile from a local car dealer for
$24,000. Shortly after purchasing the car, the subjects discovered
that the car had a major problem they had not detected during the
test drive: "[I]t occasionally stall[ed] at stop lights and stop signs
and [was] extremely difficult to start in the morning. '137 Subjects
took the car to the BMW mechanics twice. Both times the mechan-
ics claimed the car was not defective and that they could not do
anything to fix it. Their own mechanic agreed that the car's condi-
tion could not be improved.138
As a result, subjects approached the BMW dealer and asked for
a refund of their money. The dealer refused. Accordingly, subjects
retained a lawyer and filed a lawsuit against the dealer seeking a
refund. The subjects' attorney advised them that the only legal is-
sue in the case was whether the car was in fact "defective." If so, a
court would require the dealer to refund the subjects' money. If
not, the subjects would have to keep the car. The instructions in-
formed the subjects, "Your lawyer thinks this is a very close case,
and could easily go either way.' 39 Prior to trial, the BMW dealer
offered the subjects a final settlement offer of $12,000 in cash to
drop the lawsuit; the subjects could either accept the offer or reject
it and proceed to trial.
We assigned subjects randomly to either Group A (Low-Ball In-
itial Offer) or Group B (Reasonable Initial Offer). The subjects in
the two groups received identical versions of the scenario except for
a single difference: the subjects were exposed to different anchors.
137. See infra Appendices H-I.
138. See infra Appendices H-I. This detail was added to clarify that subjects could not
expect to accept a small settlement offer from the dealer and use the money to fix the car. If
they own the car after the litigation, the problems will persist.
139. See infra Appendices H-I. This advice accurately reflects the legal situation under
the "lemon laws" of a number of states. In California, for example, the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act requires sellers of expressly or impliedly warranted goods either to re-
place them or to "reimburse the buyer in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the
buyer" when the seller is unable to service or repair the goods in a reasonable time. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d)(1) (West Supp. 1994). The requirements of the Act apply when a
good has a "nonconformity which substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the new
motor vehicle." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(a) (West Supp. 1994). Disappointed buyers
of new cars routinely bring actions under this law. See, e.g., Krieger v. Nick Alexander Im-
ports, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 205 (1991); Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Cal. App. 3d 878
(1989) (noting that, in lay terms, defect is the equivalent of nonconformity).
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The BMW dealer had initially offered the Low-Ball Initial Offer
subjects $2,000 to settle the case - an offer subjects were told that
they had rejected.140 Reasonable Initial Offer subjects, on the other
hand, received an offer of $10,000, which they had rejected.14' The
instructions asked subjects in both groups to indicate their willing-
ness to accept the dealer's final settlement offer of $12,000 by se-
lecting one of our five answer choices. 142
Although the legal endowments of both subject groups were
identical - both faced a choice between a certain cash settlement
of $12,000 or an uncertain trial in which they could receive a com-
plete refund or no compensation - the opening offer anchor signif-
icantly affected the likelihood of the subjects to accept the offer or
to reject it and proceed to trial. Low-Ball Initial Offer subjects re-
sponded favorably to the final offer: their mean response was 3.54.
Reasonable Initial Offer subjects were slightly more likely, on aver-
age, to reject the offer than to accept it: their mean response was
only 2.97. This difference is statistically significant. 43 Sixty-three
percent of the Low-Ball Initial Offer subjects said they would "defi-
nitely accept" or "probably accept" the $12,000 settlement offer,
while only 34% of the Reasonable Initial Offer subjects would "def-
initely accept" or "probably accept" the final offer.
Figure 2
The Weight of an Anchor: Percentage









140. See infra Appendix H.
141. See infra Appendix I.
142. See infra Appendices H-I.
143. t(68) = 1.96, p < .05 (Mann-Whitney, p < .1). Note that the Mann-Whitney result
indicates only marginal statistical significance, making this finding slightly weaker than the
results of our framing experiments.
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These results support our basic anchor-as-frame hypothesis.
The initial anchor influenced subjects' expectations - subjects in
Group A, who received the low-ball initial offer of $2,000, expected
to settle for less, so the final offer of $12,000 looked very good by
comparison. Subjects in Group B, who received a reasonable initial
offer of $10,000, expected to settle for more, so the final offer of
$12,000 seemed less appealing by comparison. The objective infor-
mation that subjects should have used to determine the expected
value of going to trial was identical for subjects in both groups.144
Thus, there appears to be no economically rational explanation for
the differential in how the groups evaluated the $12,000 settlement
offer.
The anchoring and framing experiments both tend to demon-
strate that rational actor models cannot account for the full range of
settlement breakdown. When choosing between a concrete settle-
ment offer and an uncertain trial result, our subjects faced cognitive
biases that prevented at least some of them from acting in what
decision theorists would consider a rational manner. The framing
experiments illustrate that people use a reference point to code op-
tions as gains or losses and that this coding systematically influences
settlement behavior. The anchoring experiment demonstrates that
an opponent's opening offer may unduly influence people's expec-
tations and, hence, their decisions about whether to settle. To-
gether, the results suggest that litigants - who are not always
rational actors - may fail to reach settlement on some occasions
when settlement makes good economic sense.
IV. BLAmEWORTHINESS AND EQuiTY SEEKING AS BARRIERS TO
SETTLEMENT
A. Social Science Research on Equity Seeking
The rational actor models assume that litigants decide to settle
or seek a trial based on a comparison of the expected monetary
values of trial and settlement. 145 When litigants expect a trial
award to be more lucrative than settlement, they litigate to a ver-
144. We should note that a settlement offer can, at times, communicate information that
could reasonably affect the offeree's estimate of the lawsuit's value. For example, a low offer
can signal that an offeror has private information about the facts of the case that make him
believe he has an excellent chance of prevailing at trial. In this scenario, however, we believe
subjects could not have rationally concluded that the opening offers contained any useful
information about the lawsuit's value. Any information signaled by the settlement offer
would be embedded in the final offer. In this case, subjects in both experimental groups
received final offers of the same amount.
145. See supra sections I.A-B.
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dict. Conversely, when litigants expect to gain more money from a
settlement than from a trial, they settle. 146 These rational actor
models are incomplete because they fail to account for the impact
that relational factors may have on a litigant's decision to settle a
case or to seek vindication in court.
Social psychologists have long recognized that interpersonal
comparisons affect individual behavior.147 Most prominent among
them are equity theorists,148 who argue "that people attempt to
maintain proportionality between inputs and outcomes to them-
selves [in] comparison [to] others."' 49 According to Elaine Walster,
Ellen Berscheid, and G. William Walster, equity theory "consists of
four propositions designed to predict when individuals will perceive
that they are justly treated and how they will react when they find
themselves enmeshed in unjust relationships."'' 50 First, consistent
with rational actor models, individuals attempt to maximize their
own outcomes.' 5 ' Second, individuals are members of groups that
maximize collective equity by developing accepted systems for ap-
portioning costs and benefits equitably. The only way groups can
induce individuals "to behave equitably [is by making] it more prof-
itable for members to behave equitably.... ." Hence, groups tend
to impose sanctions - for example, prison sentences - on those
individuals who treat others inequitably. 5 2 Third, "when individu-
als find themselves participating in inequitable relationships" - re-
lationships in which the participants receive unequal relative
outcomes - "they become distressed.'1 53 Fourth, and finally,
"[i]ndividuals who discover they are in an inequitable relationship
attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity"' 54 to the
relationship.
Individuals seeking to restore equity may allow personal feel-
ings to overcome economically rational calculations when resolving
146. See supra sections I.A-B.
147. George F. Loewenstein et al., Social Utility and Decision Making in Interpersonal
Contexts, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 426, 426 (1989).
148. In addition to equity theorists, others - including relative deprivation theorists, so-
cial comparison theorists, and social utility theorists - have studied the impact of interper-
sonal comparisons. Id. at 426-27.
149. Id. at 426.
150. Elaine Walster et al., New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONALrry & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 151, 151 (1973).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 153.
154. Id. at 153-54.
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disputes. According to a team of social psychologists led by Con-
stance Stillinger and Lee Ross:
Disputants, like other individuals involved in social exchange, both
seek'and feel entitled to receive equity. Proposals that are perceived
to offer one a smaller share of available gains than that offered to
one's adversary, or even proposals that offer an equal share but one
not commensurate with the greater magnitude of one's needs or the
greater legitimacy of one's claims, violate that sense of entitlement.
Equity considerations, we argue, may lead one or even both parties to
reject a proposal that would offer both parties a clear advantage over
the status quo.15-5
B. Equity Seeking in the Litigation Context
Many researchers assume, quite logically, that litigants seeking
to restore equity may behave "irrationally" - that is, they may fail
to select options with the highest expected monetary value. We at-
tempted to bolster these assumptions with empirical data. Accord-
ingly, we designed a hypothetical litigation scenario to study the
extent to which a litigant's sense that she has been treated unjustly
by an adversary, in and of itself, impedes the resolution of legal
disputes. Such a study would be difficult to conduct using actual
litigation data because in many legal disputes the relative blame-
worthiness of the disputants affects their legal rights and reme-
dies. 5 6 Using our experimental method, however, we were able to
test for the effects of perceived inequitable treatment while control-
ling for legal rights.157
We provided subjects with a simple landlord-tenant dispute.158
Subjects were told that they signed a six-month lease to live in an
off-campus apartment beginning September 1. After two months
the heater broke down. Although they immediately notified the
landlord and requested repair, the landlord failed to fix the heater.
As a result, according to the scenario, the subjects spent four winter
months in a cold apartment attempting to keep warm with a space
heater before moving out at the end of the lease period. Through-
out this time period, the subjects had continued to pay $1,000 per
155. CONSTANCE A. STILLINGER ET AL, THE "REAc'IvE DEVALUATION" BARRIER TO
CONFLIcr RESOLUTION 4 (Stanford Ctr. on Conflict and Negotiation Working Paper No. 3,
1988) (citations omitted).
156. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, for instance, an employee who has been the
victim of intentional discrimination by her employer may recover punitive damages only if
she can show that the employer acted with "malice or with reckless indifference." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(1) (Supp. 1992).
157. See infra note 165 for a potential criticism of the experimental design along these
lines.
158. See infra Appendices J-L.
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month in rent. After moving out, they learned from a student legal
service lawyer that "there was a good chance" of recovering a por-
tion of the $4,000 in rent paid over that four-month period of time.
The lawyer gave neither a specific prediction of the likelihood of
success nor any estimate of the exact magnitude of a judgment.
Subjects learned that, with the assistance of their attorney, they had
filed an action in small claims court against the landlord.159 Prior to
the court date, the landlord offered to settle the case out of court
for $900.160
The variable tested in this scenario was the landlord's reason for
failing to repair the heater in spite of the tenant's prompt request
that he do so. Group A subjects learned that they had made a
number of calls to the landlord, to no avail. "The landlord prom-
ised to fix your heater, but he never did. A week later, you called
him again. Again, he promised to fix it, but he never did. Over the
next several weeks, you called him a half-dozen times, but he did
not return your calls.' 61 Group B participants received a different
explanation: After the second call to the landlord, "[y]ou learned
that he had left the country unexpectedly due to a family emer-
gency and that he was expected to be gone for several months."' 62
Both Group A and Group B subjects chose one of the five usual
answer choices to indicate their likelihood of accepting the $900 set-
tlement offer.
159. This scenario is quite representative of a real-world dispute and the prevailing com-
mon and statutory law. Under the implied warranty of habitability doctrine, a landlord is
responsible for repairing conditions that impair the habitability of a rental unit. Both the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1, 5.4, 5.5 (1976) and the UNIFORM RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104, 7B U.L.A. 427 (1972), provide for the implied
warranty of habitability. More importantly, at least 42 states and the District of Columbia
recognize and enforce the warranty of habitability. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation
of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503, 523-25 (1982). California, for in-
stance, requires, that "[t]he lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings
must, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1941 (West
1985).
The failure to provide heat, as in this hypothetical, is a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. Again, according to California law, "[a] dwelling shall be deemed untenantable
for purposes of Section 1941 if it substantially lacks... (d) [h]eating facilities which con-
formed with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good working order."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941.1 (West 1985). When a landlord breaches the warranty of habitabil-
ity, it is common practice for a tenant to file suit for damages. Often, courts measure the
damages "by the difference in the values of the apartment with and without the services in
question." Leris Realty Corp. v. Robbins, 408 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (Civ. Ct. 1978); see also
Cazares v. Ortiz, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1980); Parker 72nd Assocs. v.
Isaacs, 436 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Civ. Ct. 1980).
160. See infra Appendices J-L. For an explanation of how the proposed settlement
amount was derived, see supra note 66.
161. See infra Appendix J.
162. See infra Appendix K.
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The given explanation had a significant impact on how likely
subjects were to accept the settlement offer and forgo their day in
court. Knowing that the landlord did not fix the heater because he
was out of the country due to a family emergency, most Group B
(Family Emergency) subjects were willing to accept the landlord's
offer and let the matter rest. Their mean response was 3.41 (n =
58). Group A subjects (Broken Promise), in contrast, were more
likely to reject the $900 offer and risk a less favorable decision in
small claims court than to accept the offer. Their average score was
2.60 (n = 60). The difference between the two groups is highly sig-
nificant. 163 Fifty-nine percent of the Family Emergency subjects
said they would "definitely" or "probably" accept the settlement
offer, while only 35% of the Broken Promise subjects provided
those same responses. Thirty percent of the Broken Promise sub-
jects said they would "definitely reject" the $900 settlement offer in
favor of small claims court, while only 9% of the Family Emergency
subjects would "definitely reject" the offer.
Whether the equity-seeking barrier to settlement is purely psy-
chological, or whether it suggests a refinement to economic models
by demonstrating that litigants use the judicial process to maximize
a combination of monetary and nonmonetary preferences, is a de-
batable point of theory.164 Regardless of whether we label their
responses psychological or economic, however, subjects in the two
experimental groups were in the same legal position,165 received the
163. t(115) = 3.24, p < .01 (Mann-Whitney, p < .01).
164. Economic models sometimes explicitly state as an assumption that the parties seek
only monetary goals. See Shavell, supra note 40, at 56 ("The parties are assumed to view suit
and settlement or litigation solely as a financial matter .... ). Priest and Klein note that
their model of settlement assumes that neither litigant cares about the precedential value of a
jury verdict. If one or both parties do care, the bargaining range that will result in a settle-
ment is reduced. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. Priest and Klein make this
point in the context of a verdict's financial value to repeat players, such as insurance compa-
nies. But their point could be easily expanded to include one-time players who place
noneconomic, psychic value on a verdict in their favor and therefore demand a more
favorable monetary offer to settle. See generally Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on "Un-
derstanding Pennzoil v. Texaco": Rational Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. REV.
335, 337-38 (1989) (describing the factors that will make settlement more or less likely ac-
cording to the dominant economic model and concluding that "if either party affirmatively
values judgment, settlement is less likely").
165. Some readers of earlier drafts of this article suggested that our experimental design
may have failed to hold legal rights constant across groups in this scenario. Specifically, sub-
jects might have believed that if the landlord had a good excuse for his behavior, victory in
small claims court would have been less likely. If this were the case, the greater willingness
to settle on the part of Family Emergency subjects may have been due to a different expected
value calculation rather than nonmonetary factors. Although this hypothesis is plausible, a
follow-up experiment we conducted appears to disprove it. In that experiment we gave a
new group of subjects the Broken Promise group's scenario and explicitly informed them that
the result in small claims court would not depend on the quality of the landlord's excuse for
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same settlement offer, and faced the same uncertainty in court if
they refused to settle. The very different responses of the Family
Emergency and Broken Promise subjects provide empirical support
for the hypothesis that litigant victims seek more than just mone-
tary damages from the legal system.166 They seek to restore equity
to inequitable relationships. When litigants feel they have been
treated badly by the other side, the chances of settlement decrease
because litigants are more likely to seek retaliation or vindication of
their moral position in addition to monetary damages. This finding,
while intuitive, is somewhat at odds with the conventional wisdom
that litigants find the litigation process so painful, inconvenient, and
demeaning that they will pay almost any price to settle rather than
prolong the experience by forcing a trial.167 Conversely, when liti-
gants can find a sympathetic explanation for the harm they have
suffered - such as a family emergency incurred by the adversary
- they appear better able to forgive the unjust treatment, making
them more likely to accept a settlement offer.' 68
C. Will an Apology Make Any Difference?
Fortunately for the practitioner with a blameworthy client, the
discussion of equity seeking does not end at this point. The negoti-
ation literature includes some discussion about the value of an apol-
ogy.' 69 Although it seems logical that an apology can improve the
level of trust between parties in a negotiation situation, the case for
failing to provide heat. This added information made subjects no more likely to accept the
settlement offer. This experiment is presented in detail infra in section VI.B.
166. Researchers studying procedural justice have also found that disputants seek more
than just monetary damages when they enter the legal system. MacCoun et al., supra note 5,
at 105 (finding that litigants are "more concerned with issues of vindication and with ob-
taining an adequate hearing of their dispute than with the actual award that they obtain").
167. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 8-9 ("Wary of risks, delays, and costs, litigants do not
act as if propelled by an unappeasable appetite for contest or public vindication. For plain-
tiffs and defendants alike, litigation proves a miserable, disruptive, painful experience.").
168. Given the results of our experiments, an experiment testing the hypothesis that the
results would be the same in the commercial litigation setting would be illuminating. Such a
study would shed light on the behavior of corporate litigants, rather than individuals. The
results of such an experiment might add to the corporate law debate about whether corpo-
rate managers maximize value for their shareholders or pursue their personal interests.
Compare Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLuM. L.
REV. 1757, 1758 (1989) (explaining that in neoclassical economics, firms usually seek to maxi-
mize profits) with ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 114-15 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932)
(contending that managers may pursue their own interests at shareholder expense).
169. See, e.g., WILLIAM URY, GE-ING PAST No 42-43 (1991); Stephen B. Goldberg et
al., Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1987); John 0. Haley, Comment: The Impli-
cations of Apology, 20 LAW & Socy. REV. 499 (1986); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett,
The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW &
Socy. REV. 461 (1986); Walster et al., supra note 150, at 163.
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its substantive success in resolving disputes out of court has, to date,
been largely anecdotal. 170
We tested the value of the apology, empirically and in the litiga-
tion context, by adding a third group to our landlord-tenant dispute
experiment.171 Group C (Apology) subjects received the same ex-
planation for the landlord's failure to repair the heater as the Bro-
ken Promise subjects: the landlord repeatedly promised, but never
followed through. But Apology subjects were given one additional
piece of information prior to the landlord making the $900 settle-
ment offer: "Prior to the small claims court trial, you agreed to
meet with the landlord. At the meeting, the landlord apologized to
you for his behavior. 'I know this is not an acceptable excuse,' he
told you, 'but I have been under a great deal of pressure lately.' "172
Apology subjects were more inclined to accept the settlement
offer than Broken Promise subjects. Apology subjects gave a mean
response of 2.93 (n = 59) compared to the 2.60 score given by the
Broken Promise group. Although the difference between these
means falls short of statistical significance, 173 we find the distribu-
tion of the responses along the five-point scale enlightening none-
theless: whereas 30% of the Broken Promise subjects said they
would "definitely reject" the settlement offer, only 12% of the
Apology group similarly rejected the landlord's offer out of hand.
Apparently, while the apology we tested did not mitigate all of the
subjects' bad feelings, it provided enough vindication of the tenant's
moral position and sense of equity to prevent subjects from defini-
tively rejecting the offer. Whereas the modal response from the
Broken Promise group was to "definitely reject" the offer, subjects
in the Apology group were more likely to select any of the other
choices than the "definitely reject" option. 174
170. See, eg., Goldberg et al., supra note 169.
171. See infra Appendix L.
172. See infra Appendix L.
173. t(117) = 1.33, p < .1. Because the t test itself shows that this experiment's results
were not statistically significant, we do not report the Mann-Whitney result.
174. The responses of the Apology and Broken Promise groups were as follows:
Apology Group Broken Promise Group
Definitely reject: 12% 30%
Probably reject: 34% 27%
Uncertain: 19% 8%
Probably accept: 20% 23%
Definitely accept: 15% 12%
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Figure 3
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Moreover, we believe our experiment understates the efficacy of
apology for at least two reasons. First, the apology in the scenario,
as written, was not particularly forceful. Although the narration re-
ferred to it as an apology, the landlord never used the phrase I'm
sorry, or any similar expression. 75 Second, it is likely that the force
of an apology resonates more when it is expressed face-to-face than
when it is simply written down on paper. Given these limitations, it
is surprising that our results are as strong as they are.176
It is worth reiterating that although the landlord's apology was
useful in reducing the barriers to settlement caused by animus and
equity seeking, it did not remove those barriers. The Family Emer-
gency subjects (mean = 3.41) were far more likely to accept the set-
tlement offer than the Apology subjects (mean = 2.93). The
difference between these two groups is statistically significant. 177
Our findings suggest, then, that it may be difficult for litigants to
overcome fully the barriers perceived blameworthiness creates with
an apology. We hesitate, however, to push this conclusion too far.
Perhaps a more sincere or more substantive apology' 78 could re-
175. See infra Appendix L.
176. A critical analysis of the text of the apology as written may also lead to the conclu-
sion that, while labeled an "apology," what the landlord actually said constituted an "ex-
cuse," and not a very good one at that. Such a reading might further support our prediction
that a more straightforward and forcefully worded apology would increase litigants' propen-
sity to accept a settlement offer. It also implies that an excuse, like an apology, might reduce
the desire of litigants to seek a court verdict to establish the moral justification of their
claims.
177. t(115) = 2.02, p < .05 (Mann-Whitney, p = .05).
178. According to equity theorists, an effective apology "is not a single strategy for re-
storing equity but comprises several quite different strategies." Walster et al., supra note 150,
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store equity to the relationship to the point that decisions about
whether to settle are determined solely by value-maximizing
calculations.
The equity-seeking experiments demonstrate that relational fac-
tors can play a role in settlement breakdown. When deciding
whether to settle or forge ahead with trial, people consider not only
the economic value of each option but also the status of their rela-
tionship with the adversary. Our work on equity seeking illustrates
that a disputant who feels she has put more into a relationship with
an adversary than she has received in return is more likely to seek
vindication in court than a disputant who has been treated equita-
bly, even if settlement is economically rational.
V. THE REAcTIVE DEVALUATION BARRIER: ARE SETrLEMENT
OFFERS DISCOUNTED?
A. The Reactive Devaluation Construct
A team of social psychologists led by Stillinger and Ross has
hypothesized that people tend to devalue proposals solely because
they have been offered by an adversary. According to Ross and
Stillinger, a party that views a change in the status quo as favorable
may alter that evaluation upon learning that an adversary proposed
the change.179 Evidence for the existence of this "reactive devalua-
tion" phenomenon comes from a number of experiments. 180
In the first experiment to demonstrate the reactive devaluation
phenomenon - an opinion survey conducted in the United States
during the mid-1980s - researchers asked three groups of respon-
dents to evaluate a nuclear disarmament proposal.' 8' Each group
received the same proposal, but the experimenters attributed the
proposal to different parties. One group of subjects was told the
disarmament proposal had been offered by Mikhail Gorbachev, the
Soviet leader at the time. The second group was told that President
Ronald Reagan had originated the proposal. The third group was
told that the proposal came from a group of neutral "strategy ana-
at 163. In particular, an apology should (i) convince the victim that the blameworthy party's
justifications are plausible; (ii) convince the victim that the relationship between the two
parties really is equitable; (iii) humble the blameworthy party and exalt the victim, thereby
redistributing esteem; and (iv) acknowledge the inequity in the relationship but ask the vic-
tim to "forgive and forget." Id. at 163. This description suggests that blameworthy litigants
offering more sincere and substantive apologies than the one offered in our scenario are
likely to have more success at restoring equity to the harmed relationship.
179. Ross & Stillinger, supra note 11, at 394-95.
180. See STILLINGER E- AL., supra note 155, at 3.
181. Id at 6.
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lysts." 1'2 Consistent with reactive devaluation theory, respondents
who attributed the proposal to Gorbachev rated it less favorably
than respondents who attributed the proposal to Reagan. While a
mere 16% of the Gorbachev-group respondents rated the proposal
as favorable to the United States, 60% of Reagan-group respon-
dents rated the proposal favorable to the United States. Subjects
who attributed the proposal to neutral strategy analysts rated it
more favorably than the Gorbachev group but less favorably than
the Reagan group, just as the reactive devaluation theorists hypoth-
esized.183 The researchers drew the conclusion that "[t]erms that
may appear evenhanded when advanced by a neutral third party (or
even advantageous when proposed by one's own side) somehow
seem disadvantageous when it is the other side that has proposed
them."'
At least three different explanations could account for the fact
that respondents devalued the disarmament plan when it was pro-
posed by Gorbachev.185 First, the phenomenon might be explained
by what we refer to as "the fear of private information." If
Gorbachev, who had more information about the Soviet Union's
nuclear capabilities than the respondents, proposed a plan, respon-
dents might have concluded that he probably knew something they
did not and the bargain was probably good for the Soviet Union
and bad for the United States. This explanation treats the respon-
dents as rational actors who estimate the value of a specific deal in
light of information they quite rationally believe the adversary may
possess. We refer to the second possible explanation as "spite."
Even if the respondents did not value the actual proposal any less
because it was offered by Gorbachev, they might have reacted less
favorably to it because achieving the value of disarmament would
bring with it the cost of allowing Gorbachev, or the Soviet people,
to achieve something of value to them. This explanation is plausi-
ble whenever the offeree harbors negative feelings toward the of-
feror. Finally, the results might be explained, as Ross and Stillinger
argue, 86 by a psychological reaction that causes people to devalue
a proposal simply because it has been offered by an adversary, re-
182. Id.
183. Id
184. Id. at 7.
185. See also NEALE & BAzERMAN, supra note 96, at 75-77 (discussing possible explana-
tions for reactive devaluation).
186. Ross & Stillinger, supra note 11, at 394-95.
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gardless of personal feelings about the adversary. We will refer to
this explanation as pure reactive devaluation.
To mitigate "the reaction that such a phenomenon [that is, reac-
tive devaluation of the Gorbachev proposal] was obvious, or a re-
sult of purely logical reasoning, or simply 'old hat,' "187 Stillinger
and her associates conducted another experiment in which they
held the offeror constant but manipulated the offer proposed. They
hypothesized that any proposal made by the other side would be
viewed less favorably than proposals that could have been made but
were not. In this second experiment - which was conducted dur-
ing a period of heated debate over Stanford University's divestment
policy in South Africa - the researchers surveyed students' reac-
tions to two divestment proposals being considered by the univer-
sity. Students in Group A were told that the university had
proposed the "Deadline" plan, rather than the "Specific Divest-
ment" plan it had considered. 188 Students in Group B were told
that the university had proposed Specific Divestment, rather than
the Deadline plan. Students in each group were asked to evaluate
the attractiveness of the proposals. Consistent with the theory of
reactive devaluation, when the university proposed the Deadline
plan, 85% of students indicated a preference for Specific Divest-
ment. Yet when the university proposed Specific Divestment, a ma-
jority of students (60%) preferred the Deadline plan.189 In short,
"students devalued the 'proposed' plan relative to the one that had
not been proposed."' 90
Although this experiment strengthens the argument that pure
reactive devaluation caused disparities in responses, it does not
completely rule out the competing explanations for the nuclear dis-
armament results. If respondents, who generally favored divest-
ment,' 9' felt that the university opposed divestment and sought to
take the weakest steps politically possible, they might have feared
private information and readjusted their valuation of the two di-
187. STILLINGER ET AL,, supra note 155, at 7.
188. The Deadline plan called for the creation of a committee of students and trustees
charged with the task of monitoring investment responsibility with the promise of total di-
vestment in two years if the committee was dissatisfied at that time with the pace of change in
South Africa. The Specific Divestment plan called for the immediate divestment of all uni-
versity investments in corporations doing business in South Africa. Id. at 8.
189. Id.
190. Ross & Stillinger, supra note 11, at 394. Moreover, in a follow-up experiment, stu-
dents rated the divestment plan ultimately proposed by the university less favorably after it
had been proposed than before it had been proposed, when it had been one of several hypo-
thetical possibilities. STILLiNGER ET AL, supra note 155, at 11-12.
191. STILUNGER Er At-, supra note 155, at 8.
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vestment plans based on that fear. If respondents were hostile to
the university because of a perceived lack of moral fortitude, spite
might have caused respondents to look unfavorably on any plan
proposed by the university.
B. Pure Reactive Devaluation in the Litigation Context:
Inconclusive Results
To date, no one has studied reactive devaluation in the litigation
context. Whether reactive devaluation can best be explained by the
pure reactive devaluation, private information, or spite theories, its
existence in the litigation context, if demonstrable, would have im-
portant implications for the settlement of legal disputes. But the
specific policy prescriptions for litigants and attorneys would differ
widely, depending on the causal factor. Consequently, in our initial
effort to test reactive devaluation, we attempted to design our ex-
periment to test for the existence of pure reactive devaluation, con-
trolling for the fear of private information and for spite.
We asked three groups of subjects to imagine that they were
plaintiffs involved in an employment dispute.192 All subjects re-
ceived an identical set of facts. During their senior year of college,
an investment bank offered them a financial analyst position with a
salary of $40,000 per year. In reliance on that offer, the subjects
turned down a number of similar offers. One week prior to gradua-
tion, the investment bank rescinded its offer. The subjects filed suit
against the investment bank for breach of contract. Their attorney
then advised them that the only issue for the judge to determine at
trial was whether the agreement with the investment bank consti-
tuted a binding contract or a preliminary, nonbinding discussion. If
the judge determined that there was a contract, the subjects would
recover $40,000, or one year's salary. If the judge determined
otherwise, the subjects would recover nothing. The attorney, after
researching the problem, advised the subjects that the outcome
could go either way.193 To minimize the fear that the investment
192. See infra Appendices M-O.
193. To those who are somewhat familiar with contract and employment law, this scena-
rio may seem rather farfetched. After all, the general rule is that an employment contract for
an indefinite period of time is presumed to be terminable at will by either party at any time.
Thus, if a company fires an employee ten minutes after he starts working for that company,
courts will likely refuse to recognize a cause of action on behalf of that employee. See, e.g.,
Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co.,
620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); see also CAL- LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989) ("An em-
ployment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to
the other."). Recently, however, some courts have held that prospective employees who are
terminated - like the subjects in our reactive devaluation hypothetical - have a cause of
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bank had private information that would help it better evaluate the
likelihood of success at trial, the instructions informed the subjects
that "[t]he only 'evidence' that will bear on the judge's interpreta-
tion in the case is your correspondence with the firm." To minimize
the possibility of spite affecting subjects' evaluations of settlement
offers, we provided subjects with a relatively sympathetic explana-
tion of why the investment bank had revoked its offer: The Invest-
ment Bank wrote to inform you that, due to budgetary problems,
"it will be able to employ fewer graduates than it previously antici-
pated and could not hire you after all. The firm apologized for the
unfortunate situation but explained that there was really nothing
else that it could do.' 94
Prior to the trial, the investment bank offered the subjects
$25,000 to settle the case. 95 The independent variable we tested
was analogous to the variable tested in the nuclear disarmament
study: the identity of the offeror. Subjects in Group A (Adversary)
were told that "the Investment Bank has offered to pay you $25,000
if you will agree to drop the lawsuit.' 96 Subjects in Group B (Me-
diator) learned:
Your attorney and the Investment Bank jointly agreed on a neu-
tral mediator to consider all the facts in the dispute and make a non-
binding settlement recommendation; either side is free to reject it.
The mediator has suggested that as a settlement the Investment Bank
pay you $25,000 and you agree to drop the lawsuit.197
Finally, the instructions for Group C (Attorney) read, "[Y]our at-
torney informs you that he thinks he might be able to convince the
Bank to pay you $25,000 to settle the case in return for your agree-
ing to drop the lawsuit. He would like to make the offer, and he is
seeking your approval."'' 98 Subjects indicated their willingness to
accept the settlement offer by selecting one of the usual five
options.
If pure reactive devaluation is at work in this situation, we
action against the employer for breach of contract. In Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1990), for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the
promise to employ was separate from the employment contract itself. Accordingly, the court
ruled that a prospective employee, whose job offer was rescinded by the employer prior to
his start date, was entitled to damages in reliance. 915 F.2d at 1270-71. Thus, our scenario
may actually reflect an emerging trend.
194. See infra Appendices M-O.
195. For an explanation of how the proposed settlement amount was derived, see supra
note 66.
196. See infra Appendix M.
197. See infra Appendix N.
198. See infra Appendix 0.
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would predict that subjects in the Attorney group would be most
likely to accept the offer, followed by subjects from the Mediator
group, with subjects from the Adversary group the least likely to
accept. In fact, subjects in all three groups were likely to accept the
offer, with Mediator and Attorney subjects only slightly more likely
to accept than Adversary subjects. Adversary subjects provided a
mean response of 3.85 (n = 34); Mediator subjects' response was
4.06 (n = 31); Attorney subjects responded with an average of 4.10
(n = 35). None of the differences between the three means is statis-
tically significant. Accordingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the slight difference in results is due to random error and con-
clude that, in this experiment, the identity of the offeror probably
had no effect on the propensity of subjects to accept or reject the
$25,000 settlement offer.
We also tested whether pure reactive devaluation was more im-
portant in litigation scenarios involving nonmonetary settlement of-
fers. Group D (Adversary 2) and Group E (Mediator 2) subjects
faced the same scenario as the initial three groups, but with a differ-
ent settlement offer. The Adversary 2 subjects were told that the
investment bank "has offered to agree to hire you for the next
available financial analyst position at the same salary ($40,000) that
it proposed before. However, you will have to wait 6 months
before you begin working and drawing a salary."' 199 Mediator 2
subjects received the same offer, but the offer was suggested by a
neutral mediator rather than by the adversary.200 The results of this
experiment were similar to those of the preceding experiment. The
Mediator 2 subjects were slightly more likely to accept the settle-
ment offer (mean = 4.06, n = 35) than the Adversary 2 subjects
(mean = 3.88, n = 33), but the difference was slight and failed to
reach the level of statistical significance.
C. Reactive Devaluation in the Litigation Context Part II:
Exploring Other Causes
Our results suggest a number of plausible explanations, one of
which is that the reactive devaluation phenomenon might result
from either fear of the adversary possessing private information or
ill feelings toward the adversary that make it unpalatable to em-
brace any options that she suggests.20 To test these theories, we
199. See infra Appendix P.
200. See infra Appendix Q.
201. Of course the lack of a statistical difference in the responses between groups in the
employment dispute experiment could also reflect poor experimental design on our part, that
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conducted another set of experiments with more variations to allow
us to test for three possible causes of reactive devaluation
simultaneously.
In "The Supermarket Accident," subjects slipped and fell on
some pieces of fruit that had fallen to the floor at the local super-
market.20 2 This fall resulted in a severe back injury, which might
cause recurrent pain for several years. According to the subjects'
attorney, the only legal issue in the case was whether the supermar-
ket "negligently allowed a dangerous condition to exist.., that the
management should have been aware of and taken steps to rem-
edy."2 03 Subjects were told that this was a question for a jury to
decide:
On one hand, the supermarket cannot reasonably be expected to pre-
vent any fruit from ever falling on the floor or to clean up constantly.
On the other hand, this supermarket displayed its fruit in very high
stacks, which could be seen by a jury as unnecessarily creating a dan-
gerous condition.2°4
The instructions informed the subjects that if the jury decided at
trial that the supermarket was negligent, they could expect a court
to award them $20,000; if not, they would recover nothing. As in
the other cases, the subjects' attorney advised them that "this is a
close case; cases like this can and do go both ways. '205 Alterna-
tively, all subjects had the option to forgo trial and accept a settle-
ment offer of $10,000.206 They were asked to assess the likelihood
that they would accept the settlement offer on our five-point scale.
Subjects in Groups A and B (Pure Reactive Devaluation) were
told that the supermarket management treated them well and "gen-
erously" paid for physical therapy. "While you feel somewhat bad
about bringing the lawsuit, you believe that you deserve to be fairly
compensated for your injuries. '207 They were also told that the
reactive devaluation is too subtle a reaction to be triggered with only a written description of
a dispute, that any effect present was swamped by the subjects' perception that the settlement
offer was extremely generous, or that reactive devaluation is not present in litigation
disputes.
202. See infra Appendices R-W.
203. See infra Appendices R-W.
204. See infra Appendices R-W.
205. See infra Appendices R-W. This scenario is representative of the real world of per-
sonal injury tort suits. In fact, a recent A.L.R. annotation on grocery store slips and falls
contained a subcategory of cases dealing expressly with negligence suits arising from "[j]uice
or pulp from produce." Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability of Operator of Grocery
Store to Invitee Slipping on Spilled Liquid or Semiliquid Substance, 24 A.L.R. 4TH 696, 726-28
(Supp. 1994).
206. See infra Appendices R-W.
207. See infra Appendices R-S.
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only facts relevant to the jury's decision were the simple facts
presented in the description they were reading: "[T]he only uncer-
tainty is in how a jury will interpret these facts." 208 The only differ-
ence between Groups A and B was that Group A subjects received
the settlement offer from the adversary,20 9 while Group B subjects
received the offer from a neutral mediator. 210 Consistent with our
results in the job offer scenario, the willingness of subjects to accept
the $10,000 settlement was unaffected statistically by whether they
received the offer from the adversary or from a neutral mediator.
211
Groups C and D subjects (Private Information), like the sub-
jects in Groups A and B, learned that the supermarket had treated
them well during the litigation process. Unlike Groups A and B,
however, C and D subjects were not told that all the relevant facts
were known to both sides. Instead, the instructions stated:
A critical question is whether supermarket employees knew that
there was fruit on the floor before your accident but failed to clean it
up. If the answer is yes, your chances of winning at trial would in-
crease substantially; if the answer is no, your chances would decrease
substantially. This question will certainly be answered at trial, but
you do not currently know the answer. Your lawyer is uncertain
whether or not the supermarket chain knows the answer, but she as-
sumes that the supermarket chain's attorneys have interviewed em-
ployees who worked on the day of your injury.
212
The only difference between Groups C and D was that Group C
subjects received the settlement offer from the adversary,21 3 while
Group D subjects received the offer from the neutral mediator.
214
If reactive devaluation in the litigation context is driven by litigants'
fears that their adversary might possess private information rele-
vant to the outcome of the case, we would expect to see signifi-
cantly more Group D subjects accepting the mediator's settlement
suggestions than Group C subjects accepting the adversary's poten-
tially self-serving offer. The responses of the Private Information
subjects, however, were nearly identical to those of the Pure Reac-
tive Devaluation subjects; there was no statistical difference be-
tween Group C and Group D subjects.2 1 5 Despite the clear
208. See infra Appendices R-S.
209. See infra Appendix R.
210. See infra Appendix S.
211. Most subjects found the offer very generous. The mean score of Group A subjects
was 4.36; the mean score of Group B subjects was 4.22.
212. See infra Appendices T-U.
213. See infra Appendix T.
214. See infra Appendix U.
215. Again, most subjects were inclined to accept the offer. The mean score of Group C
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implication that the adversary might possess information unknown
to the plaintiff that would be relevant to evaluating the likelihood
of success at trial, subjects failed to devalue the settlement offer
made by the adversary.
Members of Groups E and F (Spite), like the Pure Reactive De-
valuation subjects, received versions of the scenario that controlled
for the possibility of the defendant possessing relevant private in-
formation by stipulating that the only legally relevant facts were
known to both parties. The supermarket, however, did not treat
the Spite subjects well throughout the process. Instead, the subjects
learned that "[t]he supermarket management has treated you
rudely since the accident. While it grudgingly paid for the physical
therapy that was not covered by your health insurance, the chain
initially claimed that you had entirely staged the accident and now
says that you were either careless, uncoordinated, or both. ' '216
Group E subjects received the settlement offer from the supermar-
ket,217 Group F subjects from a neutral mediator.218 Otherwise, the
instructions given to Group E and F members were identical.
If the reactive devaluation of an adversary's offer is a visceral
reaction primarily motivated by dislike for the adversary and the
desire to say "no" whenever the adversary says "yes," we would
expect to see a difference in the settlement rates of Groups E and
F. In this case, the data supports the hypothesis. Again, the vast
majority of subjects in both groups found the $10,000 settlement
offer generous and favored accepting it. The addition of rude be-
havior on the part of the supermarket, however, caused some sub-
jects to disfavor the offer. While 96% (25 of 26) of the Group F
subjects receiving the settlement suggestion from the mediator said
they would "definitely accept" or "probably accept" the offer, only
81% (25 of 31) of the Group E subjects receiving the offer from the
adversary would "definitely accept" or "probably accept."
Although the magnitude of the reactive devaluation phenomenon is
not large, the difference between the accepters in Groups E and F is
significant.219 The results of this series of experiments suggest that
was 4.40; the mean score of Group D was 4.38. There is no statistical difference between the
two, nor is there any statistical difference between either Group C or D and the Pure Reac-
tive Devaluation groups.
216. See infra Appendices V-W.
217. See infra Appendix V.
218. See infra Appendix W.
219. The mean score of Group E was 3.97; the mean of Group F was 4.36. t(47) = 1.73,
p < .05. The Mann-Whitney test results for this experiment, however, showed no statistical
significance.
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to the extent reactive devaluation occurs in the litigation negotia-
tion context, it may be driven largely by spite, rather than by fear of
private information or pure reactive devaluation. This in turn sug-
gests a tentative hypothesis that the psychological factors that cause
reactive devaluation might be similar to those that cause equity-
seeking behavior.
Figure 4
Effects of Identity of Settlement Offeror
GAdversary Offers
1Mediator Suggests
5 4.36 4.22 4.4 4.38 4.36
Mean 3.97
Score 3
2 ~ ~ * season
"Pure" Reactive Private "Spite"
Devaluation Information
These conclusions must be heavily qualified. First, in both series
of reactive devaluation experiments we conducted, respondents
perceived the settlement offers made by defendants as extremely
generous. In each version of the job offer scenario, at least 78% of
subjects said they would "definitely accept" or "probably accept"
the settlement offer. In the supermarket accident scenarios, at least
86% of subjects in each experimental group gave one of those two
answers.220 Because all respondents were at or near the top of the
five-point scale, it is possible that effects that otherwise would have
presented themselves were swamped by the perceived generosity of
the settlement offer. Second, it is also possible that the quality of
our experimental design was sufficient to measure a small amount
of devaluation in the spite context but not sufficiently sensitive to
detect a pure reactive devaluation effect.221
220. For an explanation of the methodology used to select offer levels for the experi-
ments, see supra note 66.
221. If our tentative findings about the factors driving reactive devaluation in the litiga-
tion scenario are correct, it may or may not be true that the same factors explain reactive
devaluation in other contexts. Pure reactive devaluation, for example, may have less impact
in the litigation context than in other contexts. In the litigation setting, an offer must be
compared to another specific option - namely, a trial. A litigant who initially devalues an
offer may be sobered by the realization that rejecting the offer means going to trial, with its
attendant risks, and reconsider her impulse to devalue. In the nuclear disarmament and di-
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While our work on framing, anchoring, and equity seeking pro-
vides compelling evidence for the existence of cognitive psychologi-
cal barriers to lawsuit settlement, our work on reactive devaluation,
though less conclusive, provides evidence of the existence of social
psychological barriers to litigation settlement as well. Specifically,
the reactive devaluation work suggests that when an offeror makes
a settlement offer, there is a risk that the offeree will devalue that
offer and opt for trial, particularly when she feels some ill will to-
ward the offeror. This psychological phenomenon, like framing,
anchoring, and equity seeking, may impede economically rational
settlement behavior.
VI. CONFRONTING THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
BARRIERS
Our results demonstrate in an experimental setting that psycho-
logical barriers to the settlement of lawsuits exist. Provided that
our results can be generalized to real-world disputes,222 we predict
that framing, equity seeking, and reactive devaluation will prevent
some parties from settling where they would otherwise be able to
reach agreement. Accordingly, parties who wish to ensure out-of-
court settlement must prepare to confront these psychological
barriers.223
Although the role of the individual parties in resolving disputes
is critically important, "the legal system's central institutional char-
acteristic" is that "litigation is carried out by agents,"224 rather than
by the disputants themselves. Thus, any discussion about con-
fronting psychological barriers requires consideration of the role
that attorneys should play. With respect to these barriers, attorneys
can focus on two analytically distinct goals. First, they can attempt
to negotiate in a manner that prevents the barriers from being con-
vestment studies discussed above, the subjects did not face a risky alternative; rather, the
only alternative was the status quo. This difference may have made devaluation of the adver-
sary's offer seem less costly, although the status quo, of course, always has its own risks. For a
brief discussion of how psychological constructs might affect litigants differently than actors
in other contexts, see supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
222. See supra section II.C.
223. We acknowledge that our discusssion in this section about minimizing psychological
barriers is rooted in the normative assumption that when there is an economically rational
settlement opportunity for both parties, it is preferable that the dispute is settled and trial,
with its attendant costs, avoided. Readers who believe that the civil justice system should
serve goals other than facilitating economically efficient settlement given the background of
the substantive law might disagree with this assumption.
224. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 510 (1994) (emphasis
added).
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structed in the first place. Second, because it is highly unlikely that
attorneys will successfully avoid all psychological barriers, attorneys
can work to minimize the impact of already-erected barriers on set-
tlement behavior. We conducted some follow-up research that
sheds light on the extent to which they may be able to accomplish
this. Our results, though preliminary, suggest that avoiding psycho-
logical barriers ex post is quite difficult.2 -5
A. Refraining the Offer
To test mitigation in the framing context, we recruited subjects
from the same pool of Stanford University undergraduate students
and gave them the same scenario we gave to the BMW Drivers in
the automobile collision scenario.2 26 We made one change in the
scenario: the settlement option, which is framed first as a loss, is
then reframed as a gain. In this second experiment, like the first,
the subjects learned that they lost their $24,000 BMW in the acci-
dent, that they could recover either $10,000 or $28,000 at trial, and
that the defendant insurance company offered them a final settle-
ment of $21,000.227 In this second experiment, however, subjects
received the following additional information to consider before re-
sponding to the offer:
Keep in mind that this settlement would leave you substantially
better off than you are now, and you would avoid the riskiness of a
trial. Although the offer is $7000 less than you hoped to recover, ac-
cepting the offer would make you $21,000 better off than you are right
now (remember, you currently have no car).228
In addition to testing the efficacy of attempting to reframe a
perceived loss as a gain, we also tested the efficacy of refraining a
perceived gain as a loss. Another experimental group received the
same scenario as the Toyota Drivers in the automobile collision sce-
nario.229 In addition, this group of Toyota Drivers was told:
Keep in mind that if you accept the offer you will be left substan-
225. The usefulness of strategies legal practitioners could employ to avoid or mitigate
psychological barriers presumes lawyers' ability to recognize psychological barriers that their
clients cannot recognize, a far-from-obvious ability. We are currently conducting further ex-
perimental research designed to measure the ability of lawyers, relative to our "litigant" sub-
jects, to recognize and respond to psychological barriers to litigation settlement.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105. Subjects in that scenario perceived the
settlement as a loss and were accordingly less likely to accept it. See supra text accompanying
note 107.
227. See infra Appendix X.
228. See infra Appendix X.
229. They tended to accept the defendant insurance company's offer, which was framed
as a gain. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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tially worse off than you were before the accident. The other driver
did cause you $28,000 worth of total damages, and accepting the offer
would make it impossible for you to ever recover the full amount of
damages. Rejecting the offer, though somewhat risky, would allow
the possibility of recouping the full amount you believe National Mu-
tual should pay you.P0
Interestingly, the results of these two experiments were asym-
metric. The BMW Drivers in the second group were only slightly
more likely than those in the first to accept the $21,000 settlement
offer. The mean score of the second BMW group was 3.81 on our
five-point scale, less than two-tenths of a point higher than the first
BMW group, and not significantly different. The second group of
Toyota Drivers, however, was far less likely to accept the settlement
offer than the first group of Toyota Drivers. The mean score of the
second group was 3.59, far lower than the first group's average
score of 4.43. The difference between the means is highly signifi-
cant,2 1 as is the difference between the percentage of Toyota Driv-
ers in the first group who said they would either "definitely accept"
or "probably accept" the settlement offer (90%) and the Toyota
Drivers in the second group who gave the same responses (64%).
Figure 5
Reframing: A One-Way Ratchet?









The fact that the second group of BMW Drivers was unable to
overcome the framing barrier does not prove that it is impossible to
mitigate the barrier created by a negative frame. Although we were
unable to mitigate the barrier with two sentences of written descrip-
tion, attorneys who can sit down, face-to-face, and explain the psy-
230. See infra Appendix Y.
231. t(63) = 3.41, p < .01 (Mann-Whitney, p < .01).
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chological barrier to their clients are likely to be more successful.
The asymmetry of results between the Toyota Drivers and BMW
Drivers, however, leads us to a tentative conclusion. The fact that
subjects learned to compensate for the psychological effects of a
positive frame but not for the effects of a negative frame suggests
that the barrier to settlement created by negative frames is not
ephemeral and might prove quite stubborn and difficult to mitigate
in real litigation situations. 2
B. Mitigation in the Equity-Seeking Context
We also attempted to measure mitigation in the equity-seeking
context. To do this, we asked another sample of subjects to accept
or reject the $900 settlement offer made by the landlord in the bro-
ken heater scenario. This group, like the Broken Promise experi-
mental group, learned that the landlord repeatedly failed to remedy
the problem without a good excuse- 3 3 But the new group of sub-
jects was advised - before responding to the settlement offer - to
consider the following:
Keep in mind when making your decision that whether you win or
lose in small claims court and how much the court might award you
will be based on the fact that the landlord failed to provide heat for
four months. The fact that the landlord behaved badly toward you by
promising to fix the heater but never following through might have
made you more upset, but whether the landlord had a sympathetic
excuse for failing to provide .the heat will not concern the court.234
This attempt to mitigate the psychological barrier, as with the sec-
ond group of BMW Drivers, fell on deaf ears. The subjects re-
sponded to the settlement offer with a mean score of 2.69,
statistically indistinguishable from the 2.60 response of the initial
Broken Promise group? 35
Although we hesitate to draw unqualified conclusions from ex-
periments that produce nonresults, we feel confident in hypothesiz-
ing that once psychological barriers are constructed, attorneys are
unlikely to eliminate the barriers entirely, although they may be
able to reduce the impact of the barriers on the settlement decision.
232. Our conclusions, based on experiments in the litigation context, are somewhat at
odds with psychological research indicating that it is relatively easy to manipulate frames in
either direction. In one study, for example, researchers found that respondents' decisions to
have surgery or to seek radiation therapy could be manipulated just by describing the possi-
ble results in terms of survival rates or death rates. Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicita-
tion of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.
234. See infra Appendix Z.
235. See supra text accompanying note 163.
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Success in minimizing the impact of these barriers will depend on a
combination of factors, including the strength of the barrier er-
ected, the skill of the attorney at mitigating the barrier, and the
bargaining range between the parties. Our complete inability to
mitigate equity seeking in the broken heater scenario, compared
with the mixed results of our refraining experiments, leads us to the
further tentative conclusion that social-psychological barriers such
as equity seeking might be harder for attorneys to overcome than
more purely cognitive barriers such as framing effects.
Our tentative conclusion that psychological barriers are persis-
tent and difficult to eliminate once they are erected raises norma-
tive and strategic questions for attorneys. In light of the evidence
that litigants will not always make economically rational decisions
about settlement, the legal profession needs to consider to what ex-
tent it is appropriate for lawyers to present settlement offers or to
relay such offers to their clients in ways that minimize psychological
barriers and thus encourage settlement.236 The question of how
lawyers might successfully go about accomplishing this also de-
serves further attention.
CONCLUSION: PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS AND ECONOMIC
MODELS
The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown - as
developed by Priest and Klein - provides an important first step in
understanding why some lawsuits settle and others go to trial. Ra-
tional miscalculation undoubtedly pushes some litigants into court
who might otherwise reach out-of-court settlement. Absent miscal-
culation, however, some litigants still find themselves in court. We
have presented experimental evidence suggesting that these liti-
gants may proceed to trial because psychological barriers to value-
maximizing behavior impede their settlement efforts. Indeed, our
research empirically grounds the hypothesis that psychological bar-
riers are powerful causal agents of trials.
The usefulness of this evidence does not require rejecting eco-
nomic thinking on the settlement-versus-trial question. On the con-
trary, the psychological barriers hypothesis complements economic
thinking. The predictions of strategic bargaining theory - as de-
veloped by Cooter, Marks, and Mnookin - can be viewed as a
236. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUaT Rules 1.2(a), 1.4 (1993) (requiring
attorneys to communicate all settlement offers to clients and mandating that clients, not at-
torneys, must decide whether or not to accept settlement offers).
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refinement to the basis laid by economic models.23 7 By layering the
variable of litigants' bargaining strategies on top of the variable of
litigants' assessments of likely trial outcomes, strategic bargaining
theory contributes to a richer understanding of the causes of trials.
Empirically demonstrated psychological barriers can be understood
as another analytical overlay.
Priest and Klein hypothesize that trials result when one or both
parties to litigation miscalculate either the probability of a victory
at trial or the dollar value of a potential judgment.P 8 They repre-
sent this insight with an equation, predicting that plaintiffs will ac-
cept a settlement offer equal to Pp(J) - Cp + Sp, where Pp
represents the plaintiff's estimate of her percentage chance of pre-
vailing at trial, J represents the expected trial judgment, Cp repre-
sents the plaintiff's cost of going to trial, and Sp represents the
plaintiff's cost of settling out of court.239 Strategic bargaining the-
ory would predict that this equation will understate the plaintiff's
minimum settlement demand. The plaintiff might demand some
amount more than Pp(J) - Cp + Sp if she believes that the in-
creased risk of the defendant's refusing to settle is small relative to
the incremental increase in her demand - say VCp, to represent
the amount of the "value" to the defendant of settling rather than
going to trial, a value the plaintiff will attempt to "claim."2' ° Our
evidence suggests that the Priest & Klein equation will also under-
state the plaintiff's minimum settlement demand by neglecting to
take account of psychological barriers. This understatement can be
described symbolically as Mp(B), where B represents some psycho-
logical barrier constant and Mp represents a magnitude coefficient
of the psychological barriers to the individual plaintiff in a particu-
lar case.
Our findings, when combined with economic and strategic bar-
gaining theories of litigation settlement, provide a deeper under-
standing of how litigants think about and react to settlement offers.
Plaintiff's minimum demand will equal Pp(J) - Cp + Sp + VCp +
MpB. Because our findings offer no guidance as to how to approxi-
mate the value of B or to measure Mp in a particular case, they are
less useful for predicting outcomes of litigation settlement negotia-
tions. Subtle differences in negotiating situations could cause B to
vary from case to case. Differences in the way individual litigants
237. See supra text accompanying notes 16-39.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
239. Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 12. This assumes that the plaintiff is risk neutral.
240. See generally Cooter et al., supra note 4.
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react to the same situation could cause Mp to vary from case to
case. Both possibilities make the specific effect of psychological
barriers difficult to model, though future research might overcome
these difficulties. More empirical study of framing, equity seeking,
and reactive devaluation in the litigation context could, in theory,
lead to numerical estimates of B values under common lawsuit situ-
ations. Although these barriers may not be economically rational,
they may very well be predictable from individual to individual,241
which would mean that numerical estimates of Mp would be possi-
ble as well. Moreover, future research could identify and model the
effects on settlement behavior of other well-established psychologi-
cal constructs, such as optimistic overconfidence,242 availability,243
and confirmatory evidence bias.244
Although the evidence of psychological barriers is, at present,
more useful for descriptive than for predictive purposes, even the
currently available evidence has some predictive power. At the
very least, our experimental findings can be used as tools to make
directional predictions regarding whether a given lawsuit is more or
less likely to go to trial, given the litigants' estimates of trial success
and bargaining postures.
241. Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman argue that the cognitive psychological barriers to
rational decisionmaking that they study - including framing and anchoring - are predict-
able. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 126, at 1131.
242. Optimistic overconfidence refers to the tendency of a decisionmaker to be overly
optimistic and overly confident about his chances of success. Kahneman & Tversky, supra
note 89 (manuscript at 2-8). Recently, Kahneman and Tversky have begun to examine the
impact of optimistic overconfidence on the litigation process. Id. (manuscript at 2-4). This
subject was also recently addressed by Loewenstein et al., supra note 12 (analyzing whether
litigants can make objective estimations of the value of a lawsuit to which they are a party).
243. Availability refers to the tendency of a decisionmaker to overestimate the frequency
of an event that is easily recalled relative to an event of equal frequency that is less easily
recalled. NEALE & BAzmu, AN, supra note 96, at 50-53.
244. Confirmatory evidence bias refers to the tendency of a decisionmaker to ignore evi-
dence that disconfirms previously held beliefs. Id. at 57-58.
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Thank you for participating in this survey designed to measure how
people involved in lawsuits respond to settlement offers. You will be
asked to play the role of a participant in three different lawsuits. In each
lawsuit scenario, you will have suffered some type of loss or injury and will
be in the process of suing another party. After reading the facts of each
case, you will be asked either one or two questions. For each question,
please check one of the five answer choices you are given. The lawsuit
scenarios will provide you with all the information you need to evaluate
the answer choices, and there are no right or wrong answers.
Please complete and return the survey now. It is very important for
the success of the project that you read all the information slowly and
carefully and do not discuss the scenarios or the questions with anyone
before you have finished.
Thank you again, for your participation.
245. The attached appendices appear in their original, unedited form. - Ed.
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 167 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
APPENDIX B
Description of the Facts of the Case:
Your new $14,000 Toyota Corolla was recently totaled in an automo-
bile accident that was clearly the other driver's fault. You sustained some
injuries that required medical treatment, but fortunately none of them
were permanent and you have completely recovered. Your $14,000 in
medical bills were paid by your health insurance company, but you have
no automobile insurance coverage that will pay to replace your car.
The other driver has no money and is unemployed, so you will not be
able to collect any money directly from him. However, he does have auto-
mobile insurance. You and your lawyer have filed a lawsuit against the
insurance company, National Mutual, for $28,000 - $14,000 for the car,
and $14,000 for the medical bills. You are not asking for any pain and
suffering damages. If you are able to recover the $14,000 for the medical
bills, that will be extra cash in your pocket since your health insurance
company has already paid your doctors and the hospital - it will be a
windfall of $14,000.
National Mutual is not disputing that you suffered $28,000 in damages,
but it claims that the other driver's policy has a maximum coverage value
of $10,000 for accidents that occur while driving a rental car. Since the
other driver was driving a rental car at the time of the accident, National
Mutual has refused to pay more than $10,000. Your lawyer has advised
you that the only issue in the case is whether or not there is in fact a
$10,000 limit on the policy for this type of accident. If the case goes to
trial, a judge will review the policy and interpret its language. If a judge
decides that there is a limit, you will recover $10,000 at trial. If the judge
decides there is no such limit, you will recover the full $28,000. Your law-
yer has reviewed the policy carefully and advised you that the language is
extremely unclear - not unusual for the fine print in insurance policies.
He cannot predict whether you are more likely to win or lose if the case
goes to trial.
Question:
Following some discussions with your attorney, National Mutual has
made you a settlement offer of $21,000, total - they will pay you that
amount if you will drop the lawsuit and agree not to make any other
claims against them. The company has told you this is its final offer and,
given the impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, you have
no reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept
the offer or reject it and go to trial. Your attorney is a family friend who is
representing you for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX C
Description of the Facts of the Case:
Your new $24,000 BMW 318 was recently totaled in an automobile ac-
cident that was clearly the other driver's fault. You sustained some inju-
ries that required medical treatment, but fortunately none of them were
permanent and you have fully recovered. Your $4000 in medical bills were
paid by your health insurance company, but you have no automobile in-
surance coverage that will pay to replace your car.
The other driver has no money and is unemployed, so you will not be
able to collect any money directly from him. However, he does have auto-
mobile insurance. You and your lawyer have filed a lawsuit against the
insurance company, National Mutual, for $28,000 - $24,000 for the car,
and $4000 for the medical bills. You have not asked for any pain and
suffering damages. If you are able to recover the $4000 for the medical
bills, that will be extra cash in your pocket since your health insurance
company has already paid your doctors and the hospital - it will be a
windfall of $4000.
National Mutual is not disputing that you suffered $28,000 in damages,
but it claims that the other driver's policy has a maximum coverage value
of $10,000 for accidents that occur while driving a rental car. Since the
other driver was driving a rental car at the time of the accident, National
Mutual has refused to pay more than $10,000. Your lawyer has advised
you that the only issue in the case is whether or not there is in fact a
$10,000 limit on the policy for this type of accident. If the judge decides
that there is, you will recover $10,000 at trial. If the judge decides there is
no such limit, you will recover the full $28,000. Your lawyer has reviewed
the policy carefully and advised you that the language is extremely unclear
- not unusual for the fine print in insurance policies. He cannot predict
whether you are more likely to win or lose if the case goes to trial.
Question:
Following some discussions with your attorney, National Mutual has
made you a settlement offer of $21,000, total - they will pay you that
amount if you will drop the lawsuit and agree not to make any other
claims against them. The company has told you this is its final offer and,
given the impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, you have
no reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept
the offer or reject it and go to trial. Your attorney is a family friend who is
representing you for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX D
Description of the facts of the case
You own a home with a large yard in a densely populated area of Palo
Alto. Last month you broke ground on a swimming pool that you are
constructing near the property line that separates your lot from your
neighbor's lot. When the builders began to dig into the ground they dis-
covered, to your surprise, that your neighbor's wine cellar extends about
10 feet onto your property, approximately three feet below the surface of
the ground. Construction of the pool ended up costing you an extra $2000
,since it had to be built around the wine cellar.
When you brought the matter to your neighbor's attention, he admit-
ted that he knew the cellar was built partially on your properly by mistake
15 years ago. He said he never told you because he didn't think it should
matter to you. After all, it was never in your way. You told the neighbor
that you did not object to the wine cellar remaining, but felt he should
compensate you for the use of your land. He refused to pay you anything.
In the face of your neighbor's refusal to discuss the matter with you
further, you have filed a lawsuit against him seeking past and future rents
for his use of your property (known legally as an easement). Your lawyer
has told you that based on the neighbor's use and the value of your land, if
you win the case you will collect approximately $15,000. However, the
chances of you winning are very uncertain. Your neighbor's lawyer claims
that the use of the land for 15 years without interruption may qualify him
for free, perpetual use of that land (known as an easement by prescrip-
tion). If your neighbor prevails in a trial, of course, he will not have to pay
you any money at all. Your lawyer tells you that there has never been a
reported case in California precisely like this one. It is impossible to pre-
dict who will win if the case goes to trial; it could easily go either way.
Your lawyer has agreed to represent you for free in this matter, so legal
fees should not affect your decisions about whether to settle the case out
of court or proceed to trial.
Question:
After meeting with you and your lawyer, the neighbor has offered to
pay you $6,750 to settle the case in return for you dropping your lawsuit.
He told you that this is his final offer and, given the impracticalities of
further meetings or discussions prior to trial, you have no reason to doubt
this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept that offer or reject it
and proceed to trial. Your lawyer has agreed to represent you for free, so
considerations of legal fees should not affect your decision about accepting
or rejecting the offer.
Will you:
definitely accept the settlement offer -
probably accept the settlement offer -
undecided
probably reject the settlement offer -
definitely reject the settlement offer -
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APPENDLX E
Description of the facts of the case
You own a home with a large yard in a densely populated area of Palo
Alto. Last month you broke ground on a swimming pool that you are
constructing near the property line that separates your lot from your
neighbor's lot. When the builders began to dig into the ground they dis-
covered, to your surprise, that your neighbor's wine cellar extends about
10 feet onto your property, approximately three feet below the surface of
the ground. Construction of the pool ended up costing you an extra
$13,000 since it had to be built around the wine cellar.
When you brought the matter to your neighbor's attention, he admit-
ted that he knew the cellar was built partially on your property by mistake
15 years ago. He said he never told you because he didn't think it should
matter to you. After all, it was never in your way. You told the neighbor
that you did not object to the wine cellar remaining, but felt he should
compensate you for the use of your land. He refused to pay you anything.
In the face of your neighbor's refusal to discuss the matter with you
further, you have filed a lawsuit against him seeking past and future rents
for his use of your property (known legally as an easement). Your lawyer
has told you that based on the neighbor's use and the value of your land, if
you win the case you will collect approximately $15,000. However, the
chances of you winning are very uncertain. Your neighbor's lawyer claims
that the use of the land for 15 years without interruption may qualify him
for free, perpetual use of that land (known as an easement by prescrip-
tion). If your neighbor prevails in a trial, of course, he will not have to pay
you any money at all. Your lawyer tells you that there has never been a
reported case in California precisely like this one. It is impossible to pre-
dict who will win if the case goes to trial; it could easily go either way.
Your lawyer has agreed to represent you for free in this matter, so legal
fees should not affect your decisions about whether to settle the case out
of court or proceed to trial.
Question:
After meeting with you and your lawyer, the neighbor has offered to
pay you $6,750 to settle the case in return for you dropping your lawsuit.
He told you that this is his final offer and, given the impracticalities of
further meetings or discussions prior to trial, you have no reason to doubt
this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept that offer or reject it
and proceed to trial. You lawyer has agreed to represent you for free, so
considerations of legal fees should not affect your decision about accepting
or rejecting the offer.
Will you:
definitely accept the settlement offer -
probably accept the settlement offer -
undecided
probably reject the settlement offer -
definitely reject the settlement offer -
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APPENDix F
Description of the Facts of the Case
For the past six months, you have been separated, but not legally di-
vorced, from your spouse. During that period, you moved out of the mari-
tal home, and your spouse and your four-year-old son remained. You and
your spouse agreed that during the separation period, you could have as
many as five visitation days per month with your son.
You and your spouse have now filed for divorce. Throughout the mar-
riage, your spouse has been the primary caretaker of your son, and the two
of them have developed an especially close bond. Accordingly, you have
agreed that your spouse should have physical custody of your son. You
also have a good relationship with your son, and you wish to preserve the
bond that has developed between the two of you. Unfortunately, you and
your spouse have been unable to reach agreement on your visitation rights
following the divorce.
If the two of you fail to reach an agreement, you will eventually have
to appear before a judge who will decide what visitation arrangements are
appropriate. Your attorney has informed you that the legal standard for
determining visitation is "the best interests of the child" standard. This
varies substantially from case-to-case, but your attorney has informed you
that judges tend to favor the preservation of both maternal and paternal
ties.
You and your attorney have agreed to meet with your spouse and your
spouse's attorney on the day before your court hearing to discuss
settlement.
Question:
At this meeting, your spouse offered you 10 visitation days per month.
Your spouse has said that this is a final settlement offer and, given the
impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, you have no reason
to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer
or reject it and go to court. Your attorney is a friend who is representing
you for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX G
Description of the Facts of the Case
For the past six months, you have been separated, but not legally di-
vorced, from your spouse. During that period, you moved out of the mari-
tal home, and your spouse and your four-year-old son remained. You and
your spouse agreed that during the separation period, you could have as
many as 15 visitation days per month with your son.
You and your spouse have now filed for divorce. Throughout the mar-
riage, your spouse has been the primary caretaker of your son, and the two
of them have developed an especially close bond. Accordingly, you have
agreed that your spouse should have physical custody of your son. You
also have a good relationship with your son, and you wish to preserve the
bond that has developed between the two of you. Unfortunately, you and
your spouse have been unable to reach agreement on your visitation rights
following the divorce.
If the two of you fail to reach an agreement, you will eventually have
to appear before a judge who will decide what visitation arrangements are
appropriate. Your attorney has informed you that the legal standard for
determining visitation is "the best interests of the child" standard. This
varies substantially from case-to-case, but your attorney has informed you
that judges tend to favor the preservation of both maternal and paternal
ties.
You and your attorney have agreed to meet with your spouse and your
spouse's attorney on the day before your court hearing to discuss
settlement.
Question:
At this meeting, your spouse offered you 10 visitation days per month.
Your spouse has said that this is a final settlement offer and, given the
impracticality of any further meetings or discussions, you have no reason
to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer
or reject it and go to court. Your attorney is a friend who is representing
you for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX H
Description of the Facts of the Case
Recently, you purchased a brand new BMW 318 automobile from your
local dealer for $24,000. Much to your disappointment, the car has one
major problem that you were unable to detect when you test-drove it: it
occasionally stalls at stop lights and stop signs and is extremely difficult to
start in the morning. While these problems don't make it dangerous to
drive, they have cut down on your enjoyment of the car. You have had
BMW mechanics look at the car twice but BMW claims that the car is not
defective and there is nothing that can be done to "fix" it. "Some cars just
stall more often than others," they told you. You took the car to your own
mechanic, and he agreed with the dealer that the problem could not be
improved. Due to what you perceive as a defect, you have asked the
dealer to take the car back and give you a refund. At this point, you
would rather buy a different model of car. The dealer has refused to re-
fund your money.
You have retained an attorney and filed a lawsuit against the dealer
seeking a refund of your money. Your lawyer has informed you that the
only legal issue is whether or not the car is, in fact, "defective," due to the
problems you have recognized. If the case goes to trial, this will be a ques-
tion for a jury to decide. If a jury decides the car's problems amount to a
defect, the dealer will have to take the car back and give you a complete
refund of your money. If the jury decides the problems do not amount to
a "defect," you will have to keep the car and will not be entitled to any
refund at all. Your lawyer thinks this is a very close case, and could easily
go either way.
Initially, the BMW dealer offered to refund $2000 of the purchase
price if you would drop the lawsuit and keep the car. You rejected the
offer. Now, with the trial date approaching, the dealer has asked for an-
other meeting with you and your attorney to discuss the possibility of set-
tling the case out of court.
Question:
At the meeting with you and your lawyer, the BMW dealer offered to
settle the case by refunding $12,000 of the purchase price if you agree to
keep the car and drop your lawsuit. The dealer told you that this is his
final offer, and given the impracticality of further meetings or discussions
prior to trial, you have no reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore,
you must either accept the offer or reject it and proceed to trial. Your
lawyer has agreed to represent you for free in this case, so considerations
of legal fees should not effect your decision about accepting or rejecting
the offer.
Will you:
Definitely accept the settlement offer -
Probably accept the settlement offer -
Undecided
Probably reject the settlement offer -
Definitely reject the settlement offer -
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APPENDIx I
Description of the Facts of the Case
Recently, you purchased a brand new BMW 318 automobile from your
local dealer for $24,000. Much to your disappointment, the car has one
major problem that you were unable to detect when you test-drove it: it
occasionally stalls at stop lights and stop signs and is extremely difficult to
start in the morning. While these problems don't make it dangerous to
drive, they have cut down on your enjoyment of the car. You have had
BMW mechanics look at the car twice but BMW claims that the car is not
defective and there is nothing that can be done to "fix" it. "Some cars just
stall more often than others," they told you. You took the car to your own
mechanic, and he agreed with the dealer that the problem could not be
improved. Due to what you perceive as a defect, you have asked the
dealer to take the car back and give you a refund. At this point, you
would rather buy a different model of car. The dealer refused to refund
your money.
You retained an attorney and filed a lawsuit against the BMW dealer
seeking a refund of your money. Your lawyer has informed you that the
only legal issue is whether or not the car is, in fact, "defective," due to the
problems you have recognized. If the case goes to trial, this will be a ques-
tion for a jury to decide. If a jury decides the car's problems amount to a
defect, the dealer will have to take the car back and give you a complete
refund of your money. If the jury decides the problems do not amount to
a "defect," you will have to keep the car and will not be entitled to any
refund at all. Your lawyer thinks this is a very close case, and could easily
go either way.
Initially, the BMW dealer offered to refund $10,000 if you would drop
the lawsuit and keep the car. You rejected the offer. Now, with the trial
date approaching, the dealer has asked for another meeting with you and
your attorney to discuss the possibility of settling the case out of court.
Question:
At the meeting with you and your lawyer, the BMW dealer offered to
settle the case by refunding $12,000 of the purchase price if you agree to
keep the car and drop your lawsuit. The dealer told you that this is his
final offer, and given the impracticality of further meetings or discussions
prior to trial, you have no reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore,
you must either accept the offer or reject it and proceed to trial. Your
lawyer has agreed to represent you for free in this case, so considerations
of legal fees should not effect your decision about accepting or rejecting
the offer.
Will you:
Definitely accept the settlement offer -
Probably accept the settlement offer -
Undecided
Probably reject the settlement offer -
Definitely reject the settlement offer -
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APPENDIx J
Description of the Facts of the Case
Late last summer, you began looking off-campus for an apartment for
the upcoming school year. You finally found a satisfactory apartment, but
the landlord would agree only to a six-month lease. After careful deliber-
ation, you signed a six-month lease and agreed to pay $1,000 per month in
rent. On September 1, you moved into your new apartment.
Everything was fine for two months. Around Halloween, through no
fault of your own, the heater in your apartment broke down. You left a
message with the landlord, requesting immediate repair due to the ensuing
winter weather. You didn't hear anything from the landlord, so you called
him again the next day. The landlord promised to fix your heater, but he
never did. A week later, you called him again. Again, he promised to fix
it, but he never did. Over the next several weeks, you called him a half-
dozen times, but he did not return your calls. For four months (Nov, Dec,
Jan, and Feb), you lived without heat but continued to pay your rent in
full. Although you were able to borrow a small space heater from a friend,
it failed to keep the apartment from feeling cold and drafty throughout the
winter. When your lease expired, you moved out and found a new
apartment.
After moving out, you told a friend what had happened to you, and she
advised you to seek legal advice through the ASSU. You met with an
ASSU attorney, who advised you that there was a good chance that you
could recover a portion of the $4,000 rent you paid during those four, cold
months. Accordingly, with the attorney's assistance, you filed suit against
the landlord in small claims court for failing to heat your apartment.
Prior to the small claims court trial, you agreed to meet with the
landlord.
Question:
At the meeting, the landlord made you a settlement offer of $900 if you
would agree to drop the lawsuit. He told you that it was the highest offer
he would make, and given the impracticality of any further meetings or
discussions, there is no reason to doubt him. Therefore, you must either
accept the offer or reject it and go to small claims court.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIx K
Description of the Facts of the Case
Late last summer, you began looking off-campus for an apartment for
the upcoming school year. You finally found a satisfactory apartment, but
the landlord would agree only to a six-month lease. After careful deliber-
ation, you signed a six-month lease and agreed to pay $1,000 per month in
rent. On September 1, you moved into your new apartment.
Everything was fine for two months. Around Halloween, through no
fault of your own, the heater in your apartment broke down. You left a
message with the landlord, requesting immediate repair due to the ensuing
winter weather. You didn't hear anything from the landlord, so you called
him again the next day. You learned that he had left the country unex-
pectedly due to a family emergency and that he was expected to be gone
for several months. For four months (Nov, Dec, Jan, and Feb), you lived
without heat but continued to pay your rent in full. Although you were
able to borrow a small space heater from a friend, it failed to keep the
apartment from feeling cold and drafty throughout the winter. When your
lease expired, you moved out and found a new apartment.
After moving out, you told a friend what had happened to you, and she
advised you to seek legal advice through the ASSU. You met with an
ASSU attorney, who advised you that there was a good chance that you
could recover a portion of the $4,000 rent you paid during those four, cold
months. Accordingly, with the attorney's assistance, you filed suit against
the landlord in small claims court for failing to heat your apartment.
Prior to the small claims court trial, you agreed to meet with the
landlord.
Question:
At the meeting, the landlord made you a settlement offer of $900 if you
would agree to drop the lawsuit. He told you that it was the highest offer
he would make, and given the impracticality of any further meetings or
discussions, there is no reason to doubt him. Therefore, you must either
accept the offer or reject it and go to small claims court.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX L
Description of the Facts of the Case
Late last summer, you began looking off-campus for an apartment for
the upcoming school year. You finally found a satisfactory apartment, but
the landlord would agree only to a six-month lease. After careful deliber-
ation, you signed a six-month lease and agreed to pay $1,000 per month in
rent. On September 1, you moved into your new apartment.
Everything was fine for two months. Around Halloween, through no
fault of your own, the heater in your apartment broke down. You left a
message with the landlord, requesting immediate repair due to the ensuing
winter weather. You didn't hear anything from the landlord, so you called
him again the next day. The landlord promised to fix your heater, but he
never did. A week later, you called him again. Again, he promised to fix
it, but he never did. Over the next several weeks, you called him a half-
dozen times, but he did not return your calls. For four months (Nov, Dec,
Jan, and Feb), you lived without heat but continued to pay your rent in
full. Although you were able to borrow a small space heater from a friend,
it failed to keep the apartment from feeling cold and drafty throughout the
winter. When your lease expired, you moved out and found a new
apartment.
After moving out, you told a friend what had happened to you, and she
advised you to seek legal advice through the ASSU. You met with an
ASSU attorney, who advised you that there was a good chance that you
could recover a portion of the $4,000 rent you paid during those four, cold
months. Accordingly, with the attorney's assistance, you filed suit against
the landlord in small claims court for failing to heat your apartment.
Prior to the small claims court trial, you agreed to meet with the land-
lord. At the meeting, the landlord apologized to you for his behavior. "I
know this is not an acceptable excuse," he told you, "but I have been
under a great deal of pressure lately."
Question:
At the meeting, the landlord made you a settlement offer of $900 if you
would agree to drop the lawsuit. He told you that it was the highest offer
he would make, and given the impracticality of any further meetings or
discussions, there is no reason to doubt him. Therefore, you must either
accept the offer or reject it and go to small claims court.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX M
Description of the facts of the case
In November of your senior year of college, you receiVed and accepted
an offer to work as a Financial Analyst for a prominent New York Invest-
ment Bank following graduation. As a result of accepting that offer, you
turned down a number of similar offers from other firms. All the positions
at the other firms have since been filled. The week before graduation, the
Investment Bank wrote to inform you that a new personnel manager had
been appointed, reviewed your file, and decided not to offer you the posi-
tion after all. Due to budgetary problems, it will be able to employ fewer
graduates than it previously anticipated and could not hire you after all.
The firm apologized for the unfortunate situation but explained that there
was really nothing else that it could do. You have retained a lawyer and
filed suit against the firm for breach of contract.
Your lawyer informs you that, in this case, the only issue is whether
your agreement with the firm was a binding contract or just a preliminary,
"non-binding discussion." If the judge determines at trial that it was a
binding contract, he will award you one full year's salary ($40,000). If the
judge determines it was a non-binding discussion, You will recover nothing.
Your lawyer has researched the problem and tells you that it is unclear
whether the correspondence between you and the Investment Bank was a
binding contract. She says it is inpossible to predict how the judge will
interpret that correspondence - the outcome could go one way or the
other. The only "evidence" that will bear on the judge's interpretation in
the case is your correspondence with the firm.
Question 1:
Following some negotiations with your attorney, the Investment Bank
has offered to pay you $25,000 if you will agree to drop the lawsuit. The
Investment Bank says this is its final offer and, given the impracticality of
any further meetings or discussions, there is no reason to doubt that this is
the case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it and pro-
ceed to trial. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal
fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept a settlement
offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided -
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX N
Description of the facts of the case
In November of your senior year of college, you received and accepted
an offer to work as a Financial Analyst for a prominent New York Invest-
ment Bank following graduation. As a result of accepting that offer, you
turned down a number of similar offers from other firms. All the positions
at the other firms have since been filled. The week before graduation, the
Investment Bank wrote to inform you that, due to budgetary problems, it
will be able to employ fewer graduates than it previously anticipated and
could not hire you after all. The firm apologized for the unfortunate situa-
tion but explained that there was really nothing else that it could do. You
have retained a lawyer and filed suit against the firm for breach of
contract.
Your lawyer informs you that, in this case, the only issue is whether
your agreement with the firm was a binding contract or just a preliminary,
"non-binding discussion." If the judge determines at trial that it was a
binding contract, you will recover a full year's salary ($40,000). If the
judge determines it was a non-binding discussion, you will recover nothing.
Your lawyer has researched the problem and tells you that it is unclear
whether the correspondence between you and the Investment Bank was a
binding contract. She says it is impossible to predict how the judge will
interpret that correspondence - the outcome could go one way or the
other. The only "evidence" that will bear on the judge's interpretation in
the case is your correspondence with the firm.
Question 1:
Your attorney and the Investment Bank jointly agreed on a neutral
mediator to consider all the facts in the dispute and make a non-binding
settlement recommendation; either side is free to reject it. The mediator
has suggested that as a settlement the Investment Bank pay you $25,000
and you agree to drop the lawsuit. You must accept the mediator's sugges-
tion (contingent upon the Investment Bank accepting it as well), or reject
it and proceed to trial. There will be no time for counteroffers or further
negotiations. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal
fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept a settlement
offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX 0
Description of the facts of the case
In November of your senior year of college, you received and accepted
an offer to work as a Financial Analyst for a prominent New York Invest-
ment Bank following graduation. As a result of accepting that offer, you
turned down a number of similar offers from other firms. All the positions
at the other firms have since been filled. The week before graduation, the
Investment Bank wrote to inform you that, due to budgetary problems, it
will be able to employ fewer graduates than it previously anticipated and
could not hire you after all. The firm apologized for the unfortunate situa-
tion but explained that there was really nothing else that it could do. You
have retained a lawyer and filed suit against the firm for breach of
contract.
Your lawyer informs you that, in this case, the only issue is whether
your agreement with the firm was a binding contract or just a preliminary,
"non-binding discussion." If the judge determines at trial that it was a
binding contract, you will recover a full year's salary ($40,000). If the
judge determines it was a non-binding discussion, you will recover nothing.
Your lawyer has researched the problem and tells you that it is unclear
whether the correspondence between you and the Investment Bank was a
binding contract. She says it is impossible to predict how the judge will
interpret that correspondence - the outcome could go one way or the
other. The only "evidence" that will bear on the judge's interpretation in
the case is your correspondence with the firm.
Question 1:
Following some discussions with the Investment Bank, your attorney
informs you that he thinks he might be able to convince the Bank to pay
you $25,000 to settle the case in return for your agreeing to drop the law-
suit. He would like to make the offer, and he is seeking your approval.
There is only time before the trial date for a single offer, so if you author-
ize this offer, it will be the only one. There will be no time for counterof-
fers or further negotiations. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for
free, so legal fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept
a settlement offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely authorize the offer
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APPENDIX P
Description of the facts of the case
In November of your senior year of college, you received and accepted
an offer to work as a Financial Analyst for a prominent New York Invest-
ment Bank following graduation. As a result of accepting that offer, you
turned down a number of similar offers from other firms. All the positions
at the other firms have since been filled. The week before graduation, the
Investment Bank wrote to inform you that, due to budgetary problems, it
will be able to employ fewer graduates than it previously anticipated and
could not hire you after all. The firm apologized for the unfortunate situa-
tion but explained that there was really nothing else that it could do. You
have retained a lawyer and filed suit against the firm for breach of
contract.
Your lawyer informs you that, in this case, the only issue is whether
your agreement with the firm was a binding contract or just a preliminary,
"non-binding discussion." If the judge determines at trial that it was a
binding contract, you will recover a full year's salary ($40,000). If the
judge determines it was a non-binding discussion, you will recover nothing.
Your lawyer has researched the problem and tells you that it is unclear
whether the correspondence between you and the Investment Bank was a
binding contract. She says it is impossible to predict how the judge will
interpret that correspondence - the outcome could go one way or the
other. The only "evidence" that will bear on the judge's interpretation in
the case is your correspondence with the firm.
Question 1:
The Investment Bank has assured you that it would still very much like
you to work for it; only budgetary problems due to the recession have
made it impossible for it to hire you now. Following some discussions with
your attorney, the Investment Bank has made you an offer to settle the
case. It has offered to agree to hire you for the next available Financial
Analyst position at the same salary ($40,000) that it proposed before.
However, you will have to wait 6 months before you begin working and
drawing a salary. The Investment Bank says this is its final offer and,
given the impracticality of any further meetings or discussion, there is no
reason to doubt that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept the
firm's offer or reject it and proceed to trial. Your attorney has agreed to
represent you for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision about
whether to accept a settlement offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX Q
Description of the facts of the case
In November of your senior year of college, you received and accepted
an offer to work as a Financial Analyst for a prominent New York Invest-
ment Bank following graduation. As a result of accepting that offer, you
turned down a number of similar offers from other firms. All the positions
at the other firms have since been filled. The week before graduation, the
Investment Bank wrote to inform you that, due to budgetary problems, it
will be able to employ fewer graduates than it previously anticipated and
could not hire you after all. The firm apologized for the unfortunate situa-
tion but explained that there was really nothing else that it could do. You
have retained a lawyer and filed suit against the firm for breach of
contract.
Your lawyer informs you that, in this case, the only issue is whether
your agreement with the firm was a binding contract or just a preliminary,
"non-binding discussion." If the judge determines at trial that it was a
binding contract, you will recover a full year's salary ($40,000). If the
judge determines it was a non-binding discussion, you will recover nothing.
Your lawyer has researched the problem and tells you that it is unclear
whether the correspondence between you and the Investment Bank was a
binding contract. She says it is impossible to predict how the judge will
interpret that correspondence - the outcome could go one way or the
other. The only "evidence" that will bear on the judge's interpretation in
the case is your correspondence with the firm.
Question 1:
The Investment Bank has assured you that it would still very much like
you to work for it; only budgetary problems due to the recession have
made it impossible for it to hire you now. Your attorney and the firm
jointly agreed on a neutral mediator to consider all the facts in the dispute
and make a non-binding settlement recommendation; either side is free to
reject it. The mediator has suggested as a settlement that the firm agree to
give you the Financial Analyst position at the same salary ($40,000) that it
proposed before and for you to agree not to begin working and drawing a
salary for 6 months. You must accept the mediator's proposal (contingent
upon the Investment Bank accepting it as well), or reject it and proceed to
trial. There will be no time for counteroffers or further negotiations. Your
attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal fees should not af-
fect your decision about whether to accept a settlement offer or reject it
and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX R
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you well (and generously paid for the physical ther-
apy that was not covered by your health insurance). While you feel
somewhat bad about bringing the lawsuit, you believe that you deserve to
be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to decide. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever falling
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. These simple facts are the
only facts that matter in the case; the only uncertainty is in how a jury will
interpret these facts.
If the jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Following some negotiations with your attorney, the supermarket
chain has offered to pay you $10,000 if you will agree to drop the lawsuit.
The chain says this is its final offer and, given the impracticality of any
further meetings or discussions, there is no reason to doubt that this is the
case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it and proceed
to trial. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal fees
should not affect your decision about whether to accept a settlement offer
or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX S
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you well (and generously paid for the physical ther-
apy that was not covered by your health insurance). While you feel
somewhat bad about bringing the lawsuit, you believe that you deserve to
be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to decide. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever failing
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. These simple facts are the
only facts that matter in the case; the only uncertainty is in how a jury will
interpret these facts.
If the jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Your attorney and the supermarket chain jointly agreed on a neutral
mediator to consider the facts in the dispute and make a non-binding set-
tlement recommendation; either side is free to reject it. The mediator, a
respected retired judge, has examined the basic facts known to both sides
and suggested that it would be a fair settlement for the supermarket to pay
you $10,000 and for you to drop the lawsuit in return. You must accept the
mediator's suggestion (contingent upon the supermarket accepting it as
well), or reject it and proceed to trial. There will be no time for counterof-
fers or further negotiations. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for
free, so legal fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept
a settlement offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX T
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you well (and generously paid for the physical ther-
apy that was not covered by your health insurance). While you feel
some'what bad about bringing the lawsuit, you believe that you deserve to
be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to decide. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever falling
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. A critical question is
whether supermarket employees knew that there was fruit on the floor
before your accident but failed to clean it up. If the answer is yes, your
chances of winning at trial would increase substantially; if the answer is no,
your chances would decrease substantially. This question will certainly be
answered at a trial, but you do not currently know the answer. Your law-
yer is uncertain whether or not the supermarket chain knows the answer,
but she assumes that the supermarket chain's attorneys have interviewed
employees who worked on the day of your injury.
If a jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Following some negotiations with your attorney, the supermarket
chain has offered to pay you $10,000 if you will agree to drop the lawsuit.
The chain says this is its final offer and, given the impracticality of any
further meetings or discussions, there is no reason to doubt that this is the
case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it and proceed
to trial. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal fees
should not affect your decision about whether to accept a settlement offer
or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX U
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you well (and generously paid for the physical ther-
apy that was not covered by your health insurance). While you feel
somewhat bad about bringing the lawsuit, you believe that you deserve to
be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to decide. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever failing
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. A critical question is
whether supermarket employees knew that there was fruit on the floor
before your accident but failed to clean it up. If the answer is yes, your
chances of winning at trial would increase substantially; if the answer is no,
your chances would decrease substantially. This question will certainly be
answered at a trial, but you do not currently know the answer. Your law-
yer is uncertain whether or not the supermarket chain knows the answer,
but she assumes that the supermarket chain's attorneys have interviewed
employees who worked on the day of your injury.
If a jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Your attorney and the supermarket chain jointly agreed on a neutral
mediator to consider the facts in the dispute and make a non-binding set-
tlement recommendation; either side is free to reject it. The mediator, a
respected retired judge, has examined the basic facts known to both sides
and suggested that it would be a fair settlement for the supermarket to pay
you $10,000 and for you to drop the lawsuit in return. You must accept the
mediator's suggestion (contingent upon the supermarket accepting it as
well), or reject it and proceed to trial. There will be no time for counterof-
fers or further negotiations. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for
free, so legal fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept
a settlement offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
HeinOnline  -- 93 Mich. L. Rev. 187 1994-1995
Michigan Law Review
APPENDIX V
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you rudely since the accident. While it grudgingly
paid for the physical therapy that was not covered by your health insur-
ance, the chain initially claimed that you had entirely staged the accident
and now says that you were either careless, uncoordinated, or both. You
believe that you deserve to be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to determine. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever failing
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. These simple facts are the
only facts that matter in the case; the only uncertainty is in how a jury will
interpret these facts.
If the jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Following some negotiations with your attorney, the supermarket
chain has offered to pay you $10,000 if you will agree to drop the lawsuit.
The chain says this is its final offer and, given the impracticality of any
further meetings or discussions, there is no reason to doubt that this is the
case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it and proceed
to trial. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for free, so legal fees
should not affect your decision about whether to accept a settlement offer
or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX W
Description of the facts of the case
Several months ago you slipped and fell on some pieces of loose fruit
in the produce section of your local supermarket and severely injured your
back. Although your doctor does not anticipate that the injury will pre-
vent you from living an active life, there is a good chance you will feel
occasional pain for many years. You have recently retained an attorney
and filed a lawsuit against the supermarket chain. The supermarket man-
agement has treated you rudely since the accident. While it grudgingly
paid for the physical therapy that was not covered by your health insur-
ance, the chain initially claimed that you had entirely staged the accident
and now says that you were either careless, uncoordinated, or both. You
believe that you deserve to be fairly compensated for your injuries.
Your attorney has explained to you that the only legal issue in this case
is whether the supermarket chain negligently allowed a dangerous condi-
tion to exist in the supermarket that the management should have been
aware of and taken steps to remedy. If the case goes to trial, this question
will be up to a jury to determine. Your attorney has told you this is a close
case; cases like this can and do go both ways. On one hand, the supermar-
ket cannot reasonably be expected to prevent any fruit from ever falling
on the floor or to clean up constantly. On the other hand, this supermar-
ket displayed its fruit in very high stacks, which could be seen by a jury as
unnecessarily creating a dangerous condition. These simple facts are the
only facts that matter in the case; the only uncertainty is in how a jury will
interpret these facts.
If the jury determines that the supermarket chain was negligent, your
attorney has advised you that you can expect to win approximately
$20,000. If the jury finds the supermarket chain was not negligent, you will
receive no money.
Question:
Your attorney and the supermarket chain jointly agreed on a neutral
mediator to consider the facts in the dispute and make a non-binding set-
tlement recommendation; either side is free to reject it. The mediator, a
respected retired judge, has examined the basic facts known to both sides
and suggested that it would be a fair settlement for the supermarket to pay
you $10,000 and for you to drop the lawsuit in return. You must accept the
mediator's suggestion (contingent upon the supermarket accepting it as
well), or reject it and proceed to trial. There will be no time for counterof-
fers or further negotiations. Your attorney has agreed to represent you for
free, so legal fees should not affect your decision about whether to accept
a settlement offer or reject it and proceed to trial.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX X
Description of the Facts of the Case:
Your new $24,000 BMW 318 was recently totaled in an automobile ac-
cident that was clearly the other driver's fault. You sustained some inju-
ries that required medical treatment, but fortunately none of them were
permanent and you have fully recovered. Your $4000 in medical bills were
paid by your health insurance company, but you have no automobile in-
surance coverage that will pay to replace your car.
The other driver has no money and is unemployed, so you will not be
able to collect any money directly from him. However, he does have auto-
mobile insurance. You and your lawyer have filed a lawsuit against the
insurance company, National Mutual, for $28,000 - $24,000 for the car,
and $4000 for the medical bills. You have not asked for any pain and
suffering damages. If you are able to recover the $4000 for the medical
bills, that will be extra cash in your pocket since your health insurance
company has already paid your doctors and the hospital - it will be a
windfall of $4000.
National Mutual is not disputing that you suffered $28,000 in damages,
but it claims that the other driver's policy has a maximum coverage value
of $10,000 for accidents that occur while driving a rental car. Since the
other driver was driving a rental car at the time of the accident, National
Mutual has refused to pay more than $10,000. Your lawyer has advised
you that the only issue in the case is whether or not there is in fact a
$10,000 limit on the policy for this type of accident. If the judge decides
that there is, you will recover $10,000 at trial. If the judge decides there is
no such limit, you will recover the full $28,000. Your lawyer has reviewed
the policy carefully and advised you that the language is extremely unclear
- not unusual for the fine print in insurance policies. He cannot predict
whether you are more likely to win or lose if the case goes to trial.
Question:
Following some discussions with your attorney, National Mutual has
made you a settlement offer of $21,000, total - they will pay you that
amount if you will drop the lawsuit and agree not to make any other
claims against them.
Keep in mind that this settlement would leave you substantially better
off than you are now, and you would avoid the riskiness of a trial.
Although the offer is $7000 less than you hoped to recover, accepting the
offer would make you $21,000 better off than you are right now (remem-
ber, you currently have no car).
The company has told you this is its final offer and, given the impracti-
cality of any further meetings or discussions, you have no reason to doubt
that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it
and go to trial. Your attorney is a family friend who is representing you
for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer -
probably accept the offer -
undecided
probably reject the offer -
definitely reject the offer -
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APPENDIX Y
Description of the Facts of the Case:
Your new $14,000 Toyota Corolla was recently totaled in an automo-
bile accident that was clearly the other driver's fault. You sustained some
injuries that required medical treatment, but fortunately none of them
were permanent and you have completely recovered. Your $14,000 in
medical bills were paid by your health insurance company, but you have
no automobile insurance coverage that will pay to replace your car.
The other driver has no money and is unemployed, so you will not be
able to collect any money directly from him. However, he does have auto-
mobile insurance. You and your lawyer have filed a lawsuit against the
insurance company, National Mutual, for $28,000 - $14,000 for the car,
and $14,000 for the medical bills. You are not asking for any pain and
suffering damages. If you are able to recover the $14,000 for the medical
bills, that will be extra cash in your pocket since your health insurance
company has already paid your doctors and the hospital - it will be a
windfall of $14,000.
National Mutual is not disputing that you suffered $28,000 in damages,
but it claims that the other driver's policy has a maximum coverage value
of $10,000 for accidents that occur while driving a rental car. Since the
other driver was driving a rental car at the time of the accident, National
Mutual has refused to pay more than $10,000. Your lawyer has advised
you that the only issue in the case is whether or not there is in fact a
$10,000 limit on the policy for this type of accident. If the case goes to
trial, a judge will review the policy and interpret its language. If a judge
decides that there is a limit, you will recover $10,000 at trial. If the judge
decides there is no such limit, you will recover the full $28,000. Your law-
yer has reviewed the policy carefully and advised you that the language is
extremely unclear - not unusual for the fine print in insurance policies.
He cannot predict whether you are more likely to win or lose if the case
goes to trial.
Question:
Following some discussions with your attorney, National Mutual has
made you a settlement offer of $21,000, total - they will pay you that
amount if you will drop the lawsuit and agree not to make any other
claims against them.
Keep in mind that if you accept the offer you will be left substantially
worse off than you were before the accident. The other driver did cause
you $28,000 worth of total damages, and accepting the offer would make it
impossible for you to ever recover the full amount of damages. Rejecting
the offer, though somewhat risky, would allow the possibility of recouping
the full amount you believe National Mutual should pay you.
The company has told you this Is its final offer and, given the impracti-
cality of any further meetings or discussions, you have no reason to doubt
that this is the case. Therefore, you must either accept the offer or reject it
and go to trial. Your attorney is a family friend who is representing you
for free, so legal fees should not affect your decision.
Will you:
definitely accept the offer
probably accept the offer
undecided
probably reject the offer
definitely reject the offer
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APPENDIX Z
Description of the facts of the case
Late last summer, you began looking off-campus for an apartment for
the upcoming school year. You finally found a satisfactory apartment, but
the landlord would agree only to a six-month lease. After careful deliber-
ation, you signed a six-month lease and agreed to pay $1,000 per month in
rent. On September 1, you moved into your new apartment.
Everything was fine for two months. Around Halloween, through no
fault of your own, the heater in your apartment broke down. You left a
message with the landlord, requesting immediate repair due to the ensuing
winter weather. You didn't hear anything from the landlord, so you called
him again the next day. The landlord promised to fix your heater, but he
never did. A week later, you called him again. Again, he promised to fix
it, but he never did. Over the next several weeks, you called him a half-
dozen times, but he did not return your calls. For four months (Nov, Dec,
Jan, and Feb), you lived without heat but continued to pay your rent in
full. Although you were able to borrow a small space heater from a friend,
it failed to keep the apartment from feeling cold and drafty throughout the
winter. When your lease expired, you moved out and found a new
apartment.
After moving out, you told a friend what had happened to you, and she
advised you to seek free legal advice through the ASSU. You met with an
ASSU attorney, who advised you that there was a good chance that you
could recover a portion of the $4,000 rent you paid during those four, cold
months. Accordingly, with the attorney's assistance, you filed suit against
the landlord in small claims court for failing to heat your apartment.
Prior to the small claims court trial, you agreed to meet with the
landlord.
Question:
At the meeting, the landlord made you a settlement offer of $900 if you
would agree to drop the lawsuit. He told you that it was the highest offer
he would make, and given the impracticality of any further meetings or
discussions, there is no reason to doubt him. Therefore, you must either
accept the offer or reject it and go to small claims court.
Keep in mind when making your decision that whether you win or lose
in small claims court and how much the court might award you will be
based on the fact that the landlord failed to provide heat for four months.
The fact that the landlord behaved badly toward you by promising to fix
the heater but never following through might have made you more upset,
but whether the landlord had a sympathetic excuse for failing to provide
the heat will not concern the court.
Will you:
Definitely accept the offer -
Probably accept the offer -
Undecided
Probably reject the offer -
Definitely reject the offer -
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